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This thesis investigates the possibility of implementing a multilevel secure local area network on
a medium-sized ship. In particular it focuses on medium-sized ship communications suite connectivity
to a GateGuard computer system, and then on incorporating systems that have been developed under
the Navy's transition plan for the Defense Message System; specifically the Multilevel Mail Server being
installed at Navy Telecommunications Centers. A review of data communications security considerations
as well as DoD and Navy directives is provided for background on the accreditation requirements of
multilevel secure systems. Additionally two commercially available products, the VERDIX Secure Local
Area Network and Trusted Information Systems' XENIX trusted operating system arc reviewed and
then shown how they could potentially be integrated into a shipboard local area network. A potential
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I. INTRODUCTION
The information age is here. Organizations with the capability to rapidly collect, process, and
disseminate information are the most successful in today's environment. This new era has not only
affected the commercial business community but also the military. It has been observed that coalition
military victory over Iraq was due, in a large part, to the allies' ability to disrupt the Iraqi command and
control structure.
A. BACKGROUND
The United States Navy is dependent upon the efficient flow of information within its ships.
Tactical information flow is vital to combat readiness and mission success; yet non-tactical information
flow should be considered a primary contributor to mission readiness. The overall efficient flow of
administrative information is to enhance combat readiness by improving the flow of non-tactical
communications vertically, horizontally, and diagonally through out the ship. To achieve this goal the
U.S. Navy requires a shipboard management information system based on a non-tactical personal
computer (PC) local area network (LAN). Administrative workload for key managers should be lessened
and the volume of paper documentation reduced. The latter feature will result in a dollar cost savings
(reduced consumable supplies, less demand on copiers), less weight and storage space consumed, and
reduction in non-productive man-hour expenditures necessary to support a paper-based information
system. [Ref. 1]
1. Current Systems
Today the shipboard non-tactical information flow resides in several independent
Automated Information Systems (AIS). These systems are normally centralized and parochial, relying
on government-owned and developed software. They are considered support systems and are dedicated
to functions such as logistics, personnel, finance, and maintenance. Large ships have been characterized
by a number of independent, but related systems. These have typically not been networks, but
centralized data processing systems with small hosts, usually minicomputers, supporting any number of
dumb terminals. The rapid proliferation of personal computers, in combination with the above systems,
has made it common to have two or three different terminals or computing devices in the same work
space, each attached to its own support system. [Ref. 2]
2. Prototype Systems
The proliferation of different and separate systems and the rapid advancement of data
communications technology has forced the Navy to reevaluate the way the way they design and procure
non-tactical systems. The initial goal for the Navy is to link as many systems as possible onto a common
fiber backbone. These include a Shipboard Wide Integrated Fault Tolerant Network (SWIFTNET) on
USS YELLOWSTONE (AD 41), the GEORGE WASHINGTON Information System (GWIS) on USS
GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73), and the early development work on the SNAP III program. fRef.
2]
a. SWIFTNET
Shipboard Wide Integrated Fault Tolerant Network (SWIFTNET) is installed in the
USS YELLOWSTONE (AD 41). There are currently a number of related, but separate, AISs on
YELLOWSTONE. They include [Ref. 2]:
• MRMS - Maintenance Resource Management System - MRMS supports maintenance work at
shore repair activities. It provides for automated work requests as well as automated job status.
• PCRS - Personal Computer Remote System - PCRS is an automated message handling system
that allows messages to enter or leave the system via a floppy disk. It is not yet a distributed net.
It is the first step in eliminating paper in the Message Center.
• SNAP - Shipboard Non-tactical ADP Program - SNAP is an AIS that provides logistic support
services from a centralized host.
The goal of SWIFTNET is to provide a common link for all of these support systems,
as well as an office automation system. The prototype system consists of a fiber optic backbone of 8-
strand fiber cable employing an FDDI architecture. Design criteria for SWIFTNET included
expendability, maintainability, survivability, performance, throughput, industry standards compliance, and
upgradability. [Ref. 2]
b. GWIS
The purpose of GWIS is to increase combat readiness by improving non-tactical
communications. The long term objective is to electronically link all work centers and shipboard offices
(approximately 250) via a PC LAN. The LAN will contain the bridges into other systems, such as SNAP,
allowing a truly integrated non-tactical information flow throughout the ship. Like SWIFTNET, GWIS
will provide a common backbone, consisting of 8-strand fiber, that will link several independent systems.
[Rcf. 1] In addition to SNAP. GWIS will attempt to link the following systems [Rcf. 1]:
• NALCOMIS - Naval Aviation Command Management Information System - NALCOMIS
supports aviation logistics afloat and ashore. Modules include material management, repair
management, and automated parts ordering.
• NAVMACS - Naval Modular Automated Communication System -NAVMACS is a family of
automated communications systems sized to the need of individual ship types. It uses a modular
concept and includes hardware and software. It is a message processing system that can route or
store incoming or outgoing messages.
• SAMS - Shipboard Automated Medical System - SAMS is a stand-alone PC that supports the
shipboard medical department.
Installation of GWIS is being conducted in a three phase effort. Phase I will provide
hardware and links to the executive level, which is all Department Heads and above. Phase II extends
communications to the Division and Work Center level. This will result in the capability to electronically
process documentation from origin to destination without interruption, and this will enhance both
vertical and horizontal levels of communication. Phase III will eventually incorporate the other existing
systems described above. (Ref. lj The GWIS will be built around several functional modules listed in
Figure 1.
GWIS is a dynamic attempt to provide a necessary service to the ship's crew. It takes
advantage of commercially available technology. " GWIS represents a valuable opportunity to prototype
a modern information system for warships, and hence make a giant leap toward the Chief of Naval
GW1S Desired Functional Modules
Correspondence. Provides E-Mail, outgoing correspondence review, distribution of incoming
correspondence and action tracing.
Readiness Reporting. Provides a database for readiness reporting, using/interfacing with existing
software to generate Navy formatted readiness reports. Provides daily department material status report
to the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer.
Planning & Scheduling. Assists in developing daily, weekly, monthly and long range plans. Provides
format and logic for producing the daily air plan and weapons load plan.
Project Management. Provides software to produce action plans and manage milestones for complex
or large projects.
Preventive Maintenance Management. Processes and stores preventive maintenance records and
generates reports.
Inspection Management. Stores results of inspections and tracks corrective action measures. Provides
tickler system for recurring inspections. Additionally, stores results of zone inspection results and
provides reports to the chain of command on corrective action.
Communications. Ultimate goal is to interface with NAVMACS to provide electronic review and
release of outgoing messages and electronic distribution of incoming messages at locations not served
by NAVMACS.
Personnel Management. Provides mid-level managers with the capability to access master personnel
database.
Electronic Library. Electronically store all instructions, publications, and other reference material for
quick retrieval.
Figure 1 Desired GWIS functional modules
Operation's goal of a paperless ship." [Ref. 1]
c. Shipboard Non-tactical ADP Program
The Shipboard Non-tactical ADP program (SNAP) has provided support services to
Navy ships since 1978. SNAP I was designed for larger ships, such as tenders and aircraft carriers, while
SNAP II is used by smaller combatants. SNAP is a centralized system, consisting of a host computer,
either the Honeywell DPS-6 or the Harris H-300, linked to many dumb terminals throughout the ship.
SNAP integrates a number of functional modules such as parts support, maintenance record preparation,
word processing, data base management, and financial records. Each of these modules consists of
specially designed software, similar to commercial versions, but written and maintained for exclusive use
by the Navy. [Ref. 2]
The author's personal experience is the SNAP II system can be characterized as
inflexible and unresponsive to user needs. In 1986, a post implementation review of user concerns
concerning SNAP II was conducted by Wheeler, Mallon, and Shotwell [Ref. 3] in which they
concluded the SNAP hardware and implementation support services were adequate for the time.
However, lack of training for end users was considered a significant problem. The authors recommended
more efficient use of the system could be corrected by:
• Belter communication with the end user
• Revision of training policy
• Revision of documentation to a more user friendly format
• Identification of a central control point for program policy, guidance, and standards.
Although the author agrees with the intent of the conclusions, several observations
are offered. The six ships on which they conducted their survey had relatively recent SNAP II
installations. The reported interviews indicated all Supply Officers were extremely satisfied with the
system. In this author's opinion this was to be expected as the Supply function was the one function that
reaped the most benefit from the system. Tracking supply requisitions and inventory control transitioned
from a paper-based to a computer based system. The SNAP II system did not greatly help any other
shipboard departments perform their respective function in near the magnitude as Supply (although it
does provide a current ship's maintenance project). The rapid procurement and proliferation of personal
computers and commercial software during this same time frame gave other shipboard departments
flexibility in their computer processing needs. Most notably word processing. ([Ref. 3] reported that one
of the biggest complaints concerning SNAP II was the system response time was significantly reduced
while word processing functions were being performed.)
SNAP III is expected to change this. In fact, in 1986 Schneidewind [Ref. 4]
recommended that SNAP III be based on commercially available hardware and software to the
maximum extent possible. Schneidewind recognized that data processing functions required for SNAP
III are not significantly different than that required by commercial industry. He argued that the Navy's
data processing functions can not be truly unique as there are a finite number of functions that can be
performed by any application. Major recommendations the report made include:
• Transition from minicomputer to microcomputer system
• Transition to proven commercial office system
• Use local area network technology
• Acquire mass storage capability
• Acquire improved graphics capability
• Consider automating ship -- shore communications
• Start to develop a procurement policy to support acquisition of the above technology.
These recommendations were basically adopted by the Naval Sea Systems Command
and it is expected SNAP III will lead the Navy into a truly distributed, PC-based, local area network and
will lead the Navy to it's ultimate goal for a paperless ship.
It is expected SNAP 111 will utilize SAFENET, the Survivable, Adaptable Fiber optic
Embedded local area NETwork. SAFENET is a network protocol that utilizes a dual redundant token
ring architecture that is ideal for the type of fault tolerant requirements the Navy demands. SAFENET
I was compliant with IEEE 802.5. SAFENET II, which will be used for SNAP III, will be ANSI FDDI
compatible. [Ref. 2]
SNAP III is still in the development process. A prototype system, called Micro-SNAP,
will be placed aboard several vessels in 1991. Additionally, several ships have had prototype paperless
ship systems on board for the past three years. Lessons learned from these efforts should make the final
development and transition to SNAP III efficient and cost effective. [Ref. 2]
B. THE PROBLEMS
The three projects discussed above represent an important problem within the Navy. Each of the
projects are serious, well-thought-out solutions to real problems, and each is valid in its own right.
However, they represent three similar, but distinct ways of solving the same problem. In fact, these are
only three well-documented solutions. They do not account for numerous other projects that have been
initiated by individual commands in installing shipboard LANs. What is needed in the long term is a
coordinated response, a single solution that will provide necessary services at the lowest possible costs.
Each project described is an excellent first step. The next step must combine the best efforts of these
systems into a single integrated solution.
Applications arc the objective of developing fiber optic LANs in the first place. The functional
modules described for the GWTS arc an excellent cross section of what the Navy should expect from any
network system. However, two particular applications are critical; They are the cornerstone efforts of
any successful shipboard system. These applications are message handling and an electronic publications
library. Unfortunately, both require security considerations which have not been satisfactorily addressed
or pursued for a solution.
1. Message Handling
Any shipboard LAN must be capable of linking with the ship's message center, and the
LAN must be capable of routing incoming and outgoing messages. An Automated Message Handling
System (AMHS) provides enough benefits to easily pay for any development and installation costs for
the LAN. An AMHS must be able lo route incoming messages to the appropriate personnel and offices,
and it must accept outgoing messages generated at the lowest level desired. In order to fully exploit the
advantages of a LAN and AMHS combination, the system must be capable of handling classified
message traffic. With the Navy's use of classifications, security clearances, and access based on need to
know, the ground work is laid for the requirement of a multi-level secure system. Although all the
previous projects have outlined the desire to integrate the message center with the appropriate LAN,
this has not been fully obtained due to the lack of a multi-level secure system. To date, the best solution
has been to establish a system high level LAN, meaning that all nodes, personnel, and data on the LAN
must all be cleared to the same level. Captain Nutwell, Commanding Officer of GEORGE
WASHINGTON, recently stated:
The hardware we're going to have in our non-tactical network is not multi-level security capable
because the computers aren't. If we wanted to process Secret, every machine on the network
would have to be Secret. I think we'll continue to process Secret the old way. [Ref. 5]
While in port, ships rely heavily on the station infrastructure for over the counter message
traffic, supply support, and maintenance support. Naval stations are in the process of developing their
own local area networks. The capability for a shipboard LAN to connect with these shore- based LANs
will be greatly advantageous, as ship repair, supply, and financial data will easily communicated. The
Defense Message System (DMS) has developed a Multi-level Mail Server (MMS) system that will
electronically transfer a ships message traffic from the local Naval Telecommunications Center to the
ship moored at a local pier. This system is designed to transfer Unclassified to Secret message traffic
to the ship. Again, an AMHS and shipboard LAN capable of distributing all the received traffic would
be greatly desired.
2. Electronic Library
This is the second critical step to the Navy's paperless ship goal. Studies have shown that
electronic storage devices such as CD-ROM can reduce the weight of paper and paper storage from 14
to 33%. On an AEGIS-class guided missile cruiser, this equates to a savings of about 23,600 pounds.
[Ref. 2]
The Surface Warfare Development Group (SWDG) is a small Navy organization with
immense responsibility. SWDG develops and evaluates new tactics and improves current tactics in the
surface Navy's three dimensions of warfare: Anti-Air, Anti-Surface, and Anti-Submarine, including
electronic warfare as well as command and control. Experimental tactics are issued as TACMEMOS,
and later updated as approved tactics in TACNOTES. Ultimately these tactics are incorporated into
Naval Warfare Publications or a ship class Combat Systems Doctrine. Additionally, tactical lessons
learned by the fleet are collected and compiled by SWDG in the development process. The entire
lessons learned and some NWPs will be coming out on CD-ROMs and will be available to the fleet in
the near future. [Ref. 6]
It has been the author's experience that these tactical information packages are often
Secret. The capability to share these documents on a multi-level secure LAN will greatly improve the
dissemination of tactics to ship's personnel, increasing combat readiness and reducing the administrative
burden of maintaining a large paper based Secret account.
C. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to address the feasibility of installing a multi-level secure LAN on
a U.S. Navy ship. The author will focus on a medium-sized ship, as he has reached the conclusion that
only large afloat commands such as aircraft carriers and tenders will be subjected to extensive research
and development of shipboard LANs. Also the command entities of the NTS will consider their job
complete once messages are delivered to their defined end user - the ship. The author considers the end
user to be the various officers and sailors on the vessels that must still drudge through a Secret paper
information system. II a multi-level secure LAN system is impractical, then one must consider two
separate shipboard LANs, with one a system level high of at least Secret. As discussed above, there are
several desired uses of a shipboard LAN that would require multi-level security. The author will attempt
to review the various alternatives and provide a recommendation on the best solution.
D. ORGANIZATION
This thesis is organized into seven chapters, each presenting background information to
comprehend the task of providing multi-level security within a LAN. Chapter II provides a background
on computer and data communications security to provide an understanding of terminology and different
approaches to providing LAN security.
Chapter III reviews the Naval Telecommunications System and discusses the required integration
of a LAN with a shipboard communications suite. A review of current Navy pursuit for a shipboard
LAN and communication suite is provided with an assessment of the Navy's current policy.
Chapter IV will provide background information on the Navy's implementation of DMS and its
capabilities. Procedures and hardware already in use at shore facilities will be reviewed to determine
a shipboard application.
Chapter V will presents certain vendor products for multi-level secure LANs. Specifically,
VERDIX's Secure Local Area Network, and Trusted Information System's XENIX trusted operating
system will be reviewed. The intent is not to provide a product endorsement but to review a method of
providing multi-level security.
Chapter VI will present a proposal for a multi-level secure shipboard LAN utilizing information
presented in previous chapters.
The final chapter, Chapter VII, will provide a summary and conclusions. Again, the author does
not intend to provide any product endorsement. The conclusions will offer one option the Navy has in
pursuing the acquisition of a shipboard multi-level secure LAN.
II. SECURITY OVERVIEW
A. BACKGROUND
Network security can be defined as the protection of network resources against unauthorized
disclosure, including accidental disclosure, modifications, restrictions, or destruction. Security has long
been an object of concern and subject to extensive research and development for both data processing
systems and communications facilities. With computer networks these concerns are combined, and for
local networks the problem is most acute. [Ref. 7]
A full-capacity local network offers direct terminal access to the network and data files and
applications distributed among a variety of computing devices and/or dumb terminals. The local network
may also provide access Lo and from long haul communications. Providing security in this type of
environment is most complex. |Ref. 7: p. 336]
Network security is a broad subject, and encompasses physical and administrative controls as well
as automated ones. To ensure an understanding of terminology and concepts presented in follow-on
chapters, the first portion of this chapter will provide a functional description of three areas of specific





The purpose of access control is to ensure that only authorized users have access to the
system and its individual resources and that access lo and modification of particular portions of data is
limited to authorized individuals and programs. Measures taken to control access in a data processing
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system generally fall into two categories: first, those associated with users or groups of users and,
second, those associated with data. [Ref. 7: p. 337]
a. Authentication
The control of user access is referred to as authentication. Authentication consists
of validating a user's identification (ID) and password, either at the network level or within an individual
host. The ID validation process ensures a user is enrolled in the validating system, while the password
validation ensures that the person signing on is not an imposter. This id/password system has developed
into a notoriously unreliable method of access control. [Ref. 7: p. 337]
In many local networks, two levels of authentication will probably be used. Individual
nodes may be provided with a logon facility to protect host/node specific resources and applications.
Additionally, the network as a whole may have protection to restrict network access to authorized users.
This two-level facility is desirable for a local network that connects disparate hosts and simply provides
a convenient means of terminal host access. [Ref. 7: p. 338]
The difficulty of authentication is compounded over a multi-access medium LAN. The
logon dialogue must take place over the communications medium and eavesdropping is a potential
threat. The eavesdropping threat can be classified as passive and active wiretapping. Passive wiretapping
means observing the data stream but not modifying it. The passive wiretapper can read user data and
also analyze LAN control data and traffic statistics. Active wiretapping means modifying the packet
stream for various effects. [Ref. 8]
Additional access control issues can be considered to fall in two classes: partial, or
distributed, access control and full, or centralized, access control.
b. Partial Access Control
Partial access control treats the network as a transparent communication link and
requires that the LAN deliver data to a node only if the data is addressed to that node. This requires
the LAN to perform five functions correctly [Ref. 8]:
• A source Network Interface Unit (NIU), a N1U that receives data for transport from its attached
node, knows with certainty the destination address of the data and correctly places the address
in the packet.
• The LAN keeps packets separated, not mixing and delivering as one packet data and/or an
address from two different packets.
• The LAN protects the address against change while the packet is in transit.
• Every NIU can positively identify its attached node.
• No NIU delivers a packet received from the LAN transport medium to its attached node unless
the packet is so addressed.
c. Full Access Control
Full access control means that in addition lo partial access control the LAN transports
data from one node lo another only if they are authorized to communicate [Ref. 8j. In this centralized
approach the network provides the logon service, which can be thought of as being associated with the
Network Control Center (NCC). In the case of a LAN, this may be accomplished by setting up a
connection between each inactive Network Interface Unit and the NCC. When the user activates a node
and desires to access the network, the connection is automatically to the NCC. After a successful logon,
the NCC then establishes a connection between the requesting node and the requested destination
address. When this connection is terminated, the original user and NCC connection is reestablished. A
similar technique would be used in a digital switch. A data port off-hook condition would result in a
connection to a logon server; after authentication, the request connection would be made. [Ref. 7: p.
338]
d. Access Control Matrix
After successful authentication, the user is granted access to a host and/or processes.
This is not sufficient for a system that includes sensitive data in its database. The authentication
procedure identifies a specific user with a profile that specifies permissible operations and file accesses.
The network operating system can enforce rules based on the user profile. However, the data base
management system must control access to specific portion of records. For example, it may be
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permissible for anyone in administration lo obtain a list of company personnel, but only certain
individuals may have access to salary information. The issue involves more than one level of detail. The
network operating system may grant a user permission to access a file or use an application in which
there are no further security checks, whereas the data base management system must make a decision
on each individual access attempt. That decision depends on the user's identity and on the specific parts
of the record being accessed. [Ref. 7: pp. 337 to 339]
A general model of access control as exercised by a data base management system
is that of an access matrix. One axis on the table consists of identified subjects that may attempt data
access. Typically, this list will consist of individual users or user groups, although access could be
controlled for terminals, hosts, or processes instead of or in addition to users. The other axis lists the
objects that may be accessed. In the greatest level of detail, objects may be individual data fields;
however, larger groupings, such as records, record types, or even an entire data base may also be objects
in the matrix. Each entry in the matrix indicates the access rights of a particular subject to a specific
object. [Ref. 7: pp. 337 to 339]
In practice, an access control matrix is implemented by decomposition in one of two
ways. The matrix may be decomposed by columns, yielding access control lists. For each object, an
access control lists specified users and their permitted access opportunities. Thus a user's name can be
checked against the access control list for that resource to see if and what type of permission has been
granted. A user must have a valid network account and the necessary permission to access the object.
Decomposition by rows yields capability tickets. A capability ticket specifies authorized objects and
operations for a user. This is a type of share level security, which works by assigning a unique password,
capability ticket, to each shared resource or database. Any user who knows the password may share that
resource. This is appropriate for environments that do not require light security measures. |Ref. 7: pp.
337 to 344]
Network concerns for access control are similar to those of authentication. Encryption
may be required to ensure secure communications on a LAN. Typically, access control is decentralized,
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that is, controlled by host-based data base management systems. However, if a network data base server
exists on a LAN, access control becomes a network function. [Ref. 7: p. 340]
2. Encryption
In the previous section eavesdropping was discussed and broadly categorized into two
areas, active and passive wiretapping. Additionally eavesdropping could be accomplished by
programming an NIU to accept packets other than those addressed to it. An effective countermeasure
is to encrypt the data in each packet.
Encryption conceals the meaning of data by changing the intelligible plaintext into
intelligible cipher text. An encryption system consists of two parts; the algorithm which is the set of rules
for transforming information, and the key which personalizes the algorithm by making the
transformation of specific data unique. Different keys produce completely different ciphertexts, therefore
communicating parties must share the same key. The key is relatively small, in number of bits, and can
be easily transported from one node to another. [Ref. 9]
Encryption algorithms may be implemented in software and hardware/firmware. Software
advantages are mostly realized when protecting stored data files and data in a host computer. Hardware
advantages include: greater processing speeds, independence from communication protocols, ability to
be implemented on dumb devices (terminals, telex, facsimile machines), and greater protection of the
key because it is physically locked in the encryption box. Tampering with the box can cause erasure of
the keys and related information. [Ref. 9: p. 496]
a. Data Encryption Standard
The Data Encryption Standard (DES), developed by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (formerly the National Bureau of Standards), is based on a conventional
encryption scheme. Original data in plaintext is transformed to a cipher coded bit form by means of an
algorithm. Upon reception, the ciphertext is transformed back to its original form if the algorithm and
key are known at the destination address. [Ref. 9: p. 499]
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DES is a member of a class of algorithms known as symmetric. This means that the
key used to decrypt a particular bit stream must be the same as that used to encrypt it. Since the DES
algorithm is publicly known, the disclosure of a key may compromise the entire message. [Ref. 9: p. 500]
Achieving key distribution can be accomplished in several ways. For two nodes A and B:
• A key could be selected by A or B and physically delivered, by courier, to the other party.
• A third party could select the key and physically deliver it to A and B.
• If A and B have previously and recently used a key, one party could transmit the new key to the
other, encrypted using the old key.
• If A and B each have an encrypted connection to a third party C, C could deliver a key on the
encrypted links to A and B.
The last course is attractive in a LAN context and could be handled by an NCC;
however, the keys used to communicate with C would have to be distributed by some means. [Ref. 7:
pp. 340 to 341]
b. Public Key Encryption
Public key encryption inherently differs from private key systems such as DES. Public
keys are based on a one way function, data is transformed to ciphertext by use of a publicly known
encryption key for the destination address. Once the data is encrypted it cannot be taken apart unless
the corresponding private key of the destination node is known. One way functions, which are relatively
easy to calculate in one direction, are computatively impossible to reverse without the private key. In
other words, the encryption/decryption can be accomplished by a pair of keys which create
transformations that are the inverse of each other. [Ref. 9: pp. 500 to 503]
3. Multilevel Security
Multilevel data processing can be described as having data of several different levels of
classification being processed on a single computer or network at the same time, while users of different
clearances are on the system. For this approach to work, the system must be trusted to maintain the
separation of different classified data and prevent users from accessing data for which they lack proper
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clearance [Ref. 10]. This requirement, based the Bell and LaPadula model, can be simply stated
in two parts. A multiple level secure system must enforce [Ref. 7: pp. 342 to 343]:
• No read up: A user can only read an object of less or equal security level.
• No write down: A user can only write into an object of greater or equal security level.
To verify that a computer system meets a promulgated policy, computer security models
have been developed. These models, in a mathematical manner, describe how to mediate the flow of
information in an ADP environment to and from users and data repositories. The abstract mechanism
that controls this flow is known as a reference monitor. [Ref. 10] The reference monitor enforces the
security rules (no read up. no write down) and has the following properties [Ref. 7: pp. 342 to 343]:
• Complete mediation: The security rules are enforced on every access, not just, for example, when
the file is open.
• Isolation: The reference monitor and data base are protected from unauthorized modification.
• Verifiability: The reference monitor's correctness must be provable; thus it must be small, simple,
and easy to understand.
In order to accomplish the above, computer operating systems were redesigned in the form
of a hierarchy of modules. The innermost level of the hierarchy has the most privilege regarding
executing code. As one moves out from the inner layer less privileges are granted and fewer functions
are able to be executed. The innermost level contains those portions of the operating system that are
most critical to security needs, specifically access control, memory, and input/output management. Taken
together, these portions of the operating system are known as the kernel of the OS. In addition to the
kernel, the system also includes trusted processes; these can run outside the kernel and are trusted not
to violate certain security rules of the model. Taken together, the kernel and trusted processes are
referred to as the Trusted Computing Base (TCB). [Ref. 10]
B. LOCAL AREA NETWORK MULTILEVEL SECURITY
Several approaches to multilevel network security have been proposed over the years.
Approaches have involved many schemes and configurations. Accordingly, a review is appropriate.
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1. Typical Network Configurations
Consideration should be given to various network configurations involving both trusted and
untrusted systems with examination of some typical connection scenarios. This discussion will be helpful
in understanding specific network security requirements and the evaluation of network security models.
The four possible network configurations are as follows [Ref. 11]:
• Untrusted computer systems on an untrusted network
• Trusted computer systems on an untrusted network
• Untrusted computer systems on a trusted network
• Trusted systems on a trusted network
a. Case 1: Untrusted Computer Systems on an Untrusted Network
In this case the untrusted systems and untrusted network operate in a Dedicated or
in a System High mode. There is no access control policy for the computer systems or the network, and
no labels are associated with information processed or transferred in the network. A network or
computer TCB is not required. Users are cleared to the maximum level, but information can range from
some low level to the maximum established network level. It is necessary to ensure information classified
above the maximum level not combine with any parts of the entire system. [Ref. 11]
b. Case 2: Trusted Computer Systems on an Untrusted Network
The computer systems are trusted to operate in a multi-level mode including the
network security level. Access control is required within the computer system. The computers TCB is
required to ensure that the information is properly labeled with the network high security level and that
information of a higher level than the network is not allowed to be placed in the network. The computer
TCB must also know the level of other computer systems within the network. [Ref. 11]
c. Case 3: Untrusted Computer Systems on a Trusted Network
The computer systems connected to the network operate in the System High mode.
Because the network can carry information of different classifications, it is necessary to attach labels
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either to information units or to virtual circuits when sessions are established. Untrusted computer
system levels must be within the range of levels for which the network is trusted and a network
mandatory security policy must be enforced. [Ref. 11]
d. Case 4: Trusted Computer Systems on a trusted Network
Both the computer systems and the network operate in a multi-level mode. Both the
computer systems and the network must have TCBs. Not all users are cleared for all information on the
network; therefore, the range of security levels of the computer systems must overlap with the
corresponding levels of the network. Both systems must ensure that they only pass information within
the corresponding security level range. This configuration also requires no illicit information flow and
that all information is correctly labeled. |Ref. 11]
2. Typical Network Security Approaches
Approaches closely parallel configurations, but there are slight differences. Approaches
that have surfaced over the years include [Ref. 7 p. 344]:
1. Physical separation: The security problem disappears if the various LANs are in separated areas
and protected at their designated security levels. This approach negates most of the benefit of the
LAN. Connectivity is limited. Security requirements permit data to be passed upward (from a lower
to higher classification area), but this approach does not facilitate such data transfer.
2. Bandwidth separation: With a broadband cable, each classification level could be assigned a
separate channel. Cross channel traffic could be supported by a multilevel secure host. A trusted
multilevel host is required.
3. Encryption: Each NIU would require encryption capability, requiring a trusted facility for
distributing keys to end points requesting a connection.
4. Trusted hosts: Liberal use of trusted host machines (Guards) may be capable of satisfying security
requirements. If the trusted host were a minicomputer, mainframes could be connected by a trusted
front end. Terminals would have to interface to the network via a trusted host.
5. Trusted NIU: This is an NIU that provides a reference monitor capability. This NIU may also be
referred to as a Trusted Interface Unit (TIU). It is a remarkably simple device.
Each approach is unique, however some are more advantageous than others. Of the five
approaches listed above, encryption and the TIUs are considered, by the author, to be most appropriate
to a shipboard environment and subsequent attention will be focused in these areas. Additionally, the
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first alternative of physical separation, may be a viable alternative for shipboard application
requirements.
a. Trusted Interface Units
The Trusted Interface Unit (TIU) is a piece of firmware that performs all the
functions of a an ordinary NIU; however, it is designed to operate at an assigned security level. Two
other functions are required:
• The TIU will label each frame that it transmits with its security level.
• The TIU will accept only frames that are labeled with its own or lesser security level.
TIU's were originally conceived to be designed and produced in three versions, in
increasing order of complexity. A single level TIU is set to monitor a single security level. The TIU must
be physically protected to the network-high level, and is designed to reliably isolate the traffic at one
particular security level from traffic at all other levels. A variable level TIU is similar to a single level
TIU, except the operator can change the level of the TIU by adjusting electronically linked terminal
switches or keyboard keys. The range of adjustments correspond to the approved security levels for that
particular TIU and terminal. A multilevel TIU requires fully trusted software; however, a network can
operate in a multilevel mode using only single and/or variable level TIUs. See Figure 2.
[Ref. 12]
b. Network Encryption
With either of the encryption approaches previously described, network encryption
can be end-to-end or link orientated. End-to-end encryption is handled by the processes at each end of
the session. In this capacity encryption becomes a presentation layer function. This approach allows
certain flexibility within the LAN, allowing encryption devices to be installed on selected nodes. The
other approach is to encrypt at the link level. Data plus all headers, except the layer 2 header are
encrypted. This encryption capability can be incorporated into a NIU. |Rcf. 7: p. 342]
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Figure 2 Example of local area network utilizing TIUs
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMPUTER SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
In December of 1985, the U.S. Department of Defense published the Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), commonly known as the Orange Book. The TCSEC is used to evaluate
the effectiveness of security controls built into automatic data processing system products [Ref. 11]. "The
basic philosophy of the protection described in the TCSEC requires that the access of subjects (i.e.,
human users or processes acting on their behalf) to objects (i.e., containers of information) be mediated
in accordance with an explicit and well defined security policy." [Ref. 11] The Trusted Network
Interpretation (TNI), commonly referred to as the Red Book, provides an interpretation of the TCSEC
for networks. The Orange and Red Books establish ratings that span four hierarchical divisions: D, C,
B, and A, in ascending order of increasing provisions of security. Each division includes one or more
numerical ratings, numbered from 1 to 3, which provide a finer-granularity rating. Stronger ratings
correlate with higher numbers. Thus evaluated systems are assigned a digraph, such as C2 or Al, that
places the system in a class in a division. Currently, the following classes exist, in ascending order: CI,
C2, Bl, B2, B3, and Al. [Ref. 13] Summary criteria for the various classes, reproduced from
the Orange Book, can be found in Appendix A.
1. Applicable Navy Instructions
When considering shipboard non-tactical local area networks, there are two distinct issues
that prevail [Ref. 14]:
• LANs which handle personal information must provide in accordance with the Privacy Act of
1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a) and the Computer Security Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-235). Any
shipboard LAN that will incorporate office automation will fall into this category.
• LANs which handle classified material must provide security protection in accordance with
Executive Order 12356 (National Security Information). Any shipboard LAN which integrates the
ship's message center to distribute CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET message
traffic with a office automation system will fall into this category.
The purpose of this thesis is to focus on the latter of the two issues; however, a brief
discussion of the personal information issue is considered appropriate because methods of risk
assessment may overlap or provide mutual support.
a. Safeguarding Personal Information in Automatic Data Processing Systems
SECNAV1NST 5239.1 (Safeguarding Personal Information in Automatic Data
Processing Systems) is the Navy's implementation instruction for the Privacy Act of 1974. This
instruction addresses personal information privacy and does not pertain to classified data. Two
enclosures to the instruction are utilized to establish a risk assessment approach which weighs the
likelihood of a security breach, the damage that would occur, and the cost of prevention. Because of the
assessment approach taken, the instruction should not be considered a set of firm requirements that are
mandatory under all circumstances. The document suggests that a mixture of technical and physical
safeguards with strict administrative controls may be more cost effective than high-cost technical
solutions. [Ref. 14: p. 11]
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b. Automatic Data Processing Security Program
OPNAVINST 5239.1A (Department of the Navy Automatic Data Processing Security
Program), implements DoD Directive 5215.1 (Computer Security Evaluation Center) within the
Department of the Navy and integrates the directive into the Navy's ADP security program.
OPNAVINST 5239.LA covers both personal security and classified data security issues. It divides data
into three protection levels:
• Level I: Classified data
• Level II: Unclassified data requiring special protection, such as Privacy Act information
• Level III: Other unclassified data
Similar to SECNAVINST 5239.1, OPNAVINST 5239.1A is based upon risk
assessment procedures intended to balance the threat, the possible damage, and the cost of
countermeasures in a cost effective manner. Certain minimal mandatory requirements are cited;
however, these are primarily regarding environmental/physical security and contingency planning as
opposed to technological issues. Additionally the instruction establishes the definition of the Designated
Approving Authority (DAA) for ADP accreditation. For most shipboard LANs this will be the
Commanding Officer, however if the LAN is operated in the Multilevel Security mode, the authority to
accredit the system rests with Commander, Naval Data Automation Command (COMNAVDAC).
Computer systems may operate for a limited time under an Interim Authority to Operate, which is
issued by the DAA. {Ref. 14: p. 13]
c. Navy Implementation of National Policy on the Control of Compromising Emanations
(TEMPEST)
OPNAVINST C5510.93D is a CONFIDENTIAL instruction that provides policy for
compliance with TEMPEST requirements. OPNAV NOTICE C5510 revises the OPNAV instruction
implementing a revised national policy on compromising emanations. This notice clarifies, revises, and
in some cases liberalizes previous requirements for full TEMPEST certification. [Ref. 14: pp. 12 to 13]
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This technical guidance and requirements are not the focus of this thesis and will not be pursued further.
The author believes the advent of fiber and use of fiber optics with LANs essentially makes TEMPEST
requirements relatively simple to fulfill.
2. National Computer Security Center's Standards
In addition to the DoD standards previously described (Red and Orange Books), the
National Computer Security Center (NCSC) has published a set of technical guidelines to help industry
develop certifiable systems and enhance the NCSC-contractor relationship in the product evaluation
phase. The guidelines promulgate testing standards to terminology that will be used. A complete
description of these various standards may be found in [Ref. 14]. A list of standards is provided below:
• CSC-STD-003-85: Computer Security Requirements
• CSC-STD-004-85: Technical Rationale Behind CSC-STD-003-85
• CSC-STD-002-85: DoD Password Management Guide
• NCSC-TG-001: Audit in Trusted Systems
• NCSC-TG-002: Trusted Product Evaluation
• NCSC-TG-003: Discretionary Access Control
• NCSC-TG-004: Glossary of Computer Security Terms
• NCSC-TG-008: Trusted Distribution
• NCSC-TG-009: Computer Security Subsystem Interpretation
• NCSC-TG-011: Trusted Network Interpretation Environments Guideline
• NCSC-TG-013: Rating Maintenance Phase
• NCSC-TG-019: Trusted Product Evaluation Questionnaire
The above guidelines are more pertinent to the computer, software, and network
development communities than to the user community. However, the documents are of interest to the
user community from the standpoint of supporting a well informed decision regarding the acceptance
of a network for a particular set of shipboard applications. |Ref. 14: p. 13]
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III. NAVAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
The Naval Telecommunications System (NTS) embraces all naval telecommunications operations
that provide for the exchange information among naval forces at sea, in the air, and ashore
[Ref. 15].
A. BACKGROUND
The NTS system is designed to get necessary communications to the fleet. Using the Defense
Communications System as a backbone, the Navy has designed ashore and afloat automated systems to
process narrative and data pattern messages. [Ref. 16]
1. Ashore Systems
Shore communications stations are the backbone of the NTS. The Naval Communications
Master Stations (NAVCAMS) and the Naval Communications Station (NAVCOMMSTA) provide the
conduit for communications between shore commands and the fleet. A summary from NTP-4C [Ref.
16: pp. 2-1 to 2-5] of major elements of the shore site of NTS, pertinent to this thesis, are provided
below:
• Au> matic Digital Network (AUTODIN)- AUTODIN is a world-wide Department of Defense
computerized system which provides automatic switching of message traffic providing significantly
fast service to ashore locations. The system transmits both narrative and data pattern (either card
or magnetic tape) messages. Autodin provides five modes of operation that provide for the
variation in speed from 100.
• words-per-minute duplex teletypewriter to 2400 baud terminals.
• Naval Communications Processing and Routing System (NAVCOMPARS)- NAVCOMPARS is
the automated communications system which serves as the interface with AUTODIN or other
networks ashore and operational fleet units. The system provides fleet support through broadcast
management, CUDIXS or full period terminations and primary ship/shore circuits. There are five
NAVCOMPAR sites, one at each of the four NAVCAMS plus one at NAVCOMSTA Stockton,
California.
• Local Digital Message Exchange (LDMX)- The LDMX provides automatic message routing and
reformatting for ashore Navy commands. It satisfies the Defense Communication Agency (DCA)
criteria for AUTODIN access and permits entry of traffic through optical character recognition
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equipment (OCRE). The system directly distributes incoming messages to and serves as the file
and retrieval location for remote subscribers.
• Standard Remote Terminal (SRT)/Remote Information Exchange Terminal (RIXT)- SRT/RIXT
is an input/output terminal which allows remote users to access AUTODIN.
• Common User Digital Information Exchange System (CUDIXS)- The CUDIXS system could be
classified in ashore and afloat systems, but its primary components are located at the five
NAVCOMPARS sites. This system provides a 2400 baud satellite link and full duplex interface
for the receipt and transmission of narrative message traffic between NAVCOMPARS and the
ships equipped with afloat automated systems.
2. Afloat Systems
The heart of the Navy afloat communication system is the Naval Modular Automated
Communication System (NAVMACS). The system is designed to increase the speed, efficiency and
capacity of the naval afloat and ashore communications operations. The NAVMACS modular concept
allows the system to be configured to the particular ship class. Each NAVMACS system includes a
unique device for the composition or entry of outgoing messages. For example, a message entry in
NAVMACS V2 requires a paper tape copy of the message. Each ship has a specific type of output
device for delivery of incoming addressed messages. On NAVMACS V2/V3 ships, a reproduced copy
of a message is hand delivered to the reader. However, NAVMACS V5 provides on-line remote
distribution for addressed messages which can be viewed on a Keyboard Video Display Terminal
(KVDT) screen and/or printed on a remote printer. |Ref. 17| With emphasis on the types of
message entry or delivery devices provided by each system, the various hardware/software configurations
for NAVMACS equipped ships are described below:
• NAVMACS (V)l. This single AN/UYK-20 minicomputer-based system is used on small ships
with minimal communication requirements. The NAVMACS (V)l system can simultaneously
input and screen message traffic from four fleet broadcast channels and interface with the
CUDIXS Link. NAVMACS (V)l CUDIXS Link communication is limited to send-only for
message traffic. Message entry for outgoing traffic is via paper tape, and distribution of incoming
addressed messages is manual, using reproduced copies. Delivery devices are four 75-baud
teletype page printers. Message composition is accomplished using teletype equipment which
produces 5-level paper tapes of outgoing messages. [Ref. 17]
• NAVMACS V2. A single AN/UYK-20 or AN/UYK-44 minicomputer-based system,
NAVMACS V2 is installed on small ships with more peripheral equipment than NAVMACS VI.
The NAVMACS V2 system can simultaneously input and screen message traffic from four fleet
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broadcast channels and the CUDIXS Link - CUDIXS Link communications are half duplex,
providing the input and output of message traffic. Message entry for outgoing traffic is via paper
tape, and distribution of addressed incoming messages is manual, using reproduced copies.
Delivery devices are two 2400-baud medium-speed line printers. Outgoing message composition
can be provided by a Message Preparation Device (MPD), if installed. The output of the MPD
via the NAVMACS program is a 5-level paper tape of the message and a printed copy of the
message. If no MPDs are installed, message composition is accomplished by using teletype
equipment which produces a 5-level paper tape of the message. Other means of 5-level tape
production already being used on some ships are discussed later. [Ref. 17]
NAVMACS V3. NAVMACS V3 is a dual AN/UYK-20 minicomputer-based system for large
ships. The NAVMACS V3 system can simultaneously input and screen message traffic from four
fleet broadcast channels, four Full-Period Termination (FPT) channels, and the CUDIXS Link.
CUDIXS Link communications arc half duplex, providing the input and output of message traffic.
The FPT circuits are full duplex, providing simultaneous input and output of message traffic. The
primary means of message entry for outgoing traffic is by message composition at one of the
on-line KVDTs. Once the message is composed, it can be transmitted without being re-entered
by paper tape. Another method of outgoing message entry is via paper tape. The message is
loaded into the system, and if no formal errors are delected, the message is output on the desired
circuit. Distribution of incoming addressed messages is manual, using reproduced copies.
Delivery devices are two 2400-baud medium-speed line printers. [Ref. 17)
NAVMACS V5/V5A. Up to three AN/UYK-20A or AN/UYK-44 minicomputers are used in
this system for very large ships with the greatest communication requirements. The NAVMACS
V5/V5A system can simultaneously input and screen message traffic from multiple channels of
fleet broadcast, FPT, remote devices, and remote systems. CUDIXS Link communications are
half duplex, providing the input and output of message traffic. The FPT circuits are full duplex,
providing the simultaneous input and output of message traffic. The primary means of message
entry for outgoing traffic is message composition at one of the on-line KVDTs. Once the message
is composed, it can be transmitted without being re-entered by paper tape. A second method of
outgoing message entry is via paper tape. A third method of outgoing message entry is from a
remote system such as the Personal Computer Remote System (PCRS) or the Naval Intelligence
Processing System (NIPS). If no format errors are detected, the message is output on the desired
circuit. Distribution of incoming addressed messages is automatic and controlled by a data base
maintained by NAVMACS operators. On ship delivery devices include medium-speed line
printers, KVDTs, paper tape punches, and remote systems. (Ref. 17]
The NAVMACS systems have nol kept pace with the technology and proliferation of PCs
and word processing software during the 1980's. Navy personnel, now more computer literate, find the
message preparation capabilities in NAVMACS limiting and less flexible than commercial text editors;
consequently, many ships have purchased PCs and software for message composition and editing. To
provide the media for outgoing message entry for the NAVMACS systems, ships have also purchased
paper tape reader/punches to provide paper tapes. Expensive message preparation terminals, with very
limited text editing capability, using the MPDs and KVDTs are therefore ignored. [Ref. 17]
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B. SYNCROTECH SOFTWARE CORPORATION INVESTIGATION
On April 26, 1991 Syncrolech Software Corporation provided results to NCTS concerning a study
of options for connecting the Naval Modular Automated Communications Systems (NAVMACS) and
personal computer (PC)-based Local Area Networks (LAN) aboard Navy ships. The report
demonstrated the feasibility of interfacing all systems with GateGuard. GateGuard is a PC-based,
software-controlled system which is already used as a shore-based communications link between
Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) Subscriber Terminals (AST) and Office Automation Systems
(OAS) via a LAN. GateGuard functions as a gateway to AUTODIN and provides the protection of a
security guard device separating AUTODIN and the OAS. The system's name is derived from these
basic functions. [Ref. 17]
1. Syncrotech Corporation Assumptions
Syncrolech based their investigation on several assumptions which are provided below from
[Ref. 17]:
1. If required the NAVMACS family of software could be modified. However, the amount of coding
needed to implement a new Input/Output (I/O) driver to handle a PC/GateGuard interface
required investigation. Any additional code would reduce the already low amount of dynamic
memory used to temporarily store incoming messages. This is most critical in NAVMACS V2, which
has no long-term storage. NAVMACS VI was not a candidate for the PC/GateGuard interface.
2. For security reasons, the GateGuard terminal would be co-located with the NAVMACS V2/V3
systems, since NAVMACS V2 provides no security control for delivery devices, and NAVMACS V3
only provides security control for transmit circuits. GateGuard would provide the security protection
required for NAVMACS V2/V3 remote distribution. NAVMACS V5 can control the level of
security for any remote system or device.
3. The current screening/control functions (c. g -, Command Guard List (CGL), Local Routing List
(LRL), or all NAVMACS V5 screening) would remain in the respective NAVMACS programs, and
GateGuard would only be used to augment these functions at an office level. The final control of
when and how a message is transmitted on a specific circuit would also still remain in the
NAVMACS program.
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2. Syncrotech Corporation Proposed Solutions
In Syncrotech's report the final proposed solutions fell into three categories; a solution for
NAVMACS V5, a solution for NAVMACS V2 and V3, and a long term solution for the entire
NAVMACS modular family. The proposed solutions, from [Ref. 17] are summarized below.
1. NAVMACS V5/V5A - NAVMACS V5/V5A currently supports a remote system interface which
provides a path for outgoing message entry and remote distribution. The Generic Interface Design
Specification (IDS) for NAVMACS V5/V5A provides the information necessary to pass messages
to and from NAVMACS V5/V5A. Using this interface, NAVMACS V5/V5A could be connected
to GateGuard. NAVMACS V5/V5A would interface with GaleGuard via a Bus Interface Unit (BIU)
while the ship is underway. While in port, the Gateguard could connect with the local NTCC, via
secure telephone communications, for over the counter message traffic delivery. The various interface
connections are made possible by the BIU, which provides the required interface level conversions
and handles the interface protocol necessary to pass message data. The software-controlled interface
protocol in the BIU would have lo be changed to communicate using NAVMACS V5/V5A generic
interface protocol while the ship is underway. While the ship is in port, the BIU could use the
existing AST protocol to interface with the shore. The software in the BIU which communicates with
GateGuard would remain unchanged in either case. Changes to the NAVMACS V5/V5A remote
system interface were analyzed but were not proposed because these Ilex channels are now used by
several other systems. Any software to handle the current BIU protocol would require additional
changes to the NAVMACS V5 operating system, as well as the addition of a new remote system
software control module.
2. NAVMACS V2/V3. As designed, NAVMACS V2/V3 software does not provide a remote
interface for message entry and delivery. However, NAVMACS V2/V3 does provide an International
Telegraph Alphabet #2 (ITA-2) Baudot interface which inputs data from and outputs data to a
75-baud ITA-2 Baudot device, normally a paper tape reader/punch. Access to this I/O channel is
provided via a secure patch panel. The program controlled baud rate for this channel is currently set
at the lowest rate on the AN/UYK-20 I/O card. The rale may be changed by reslrapping the I/O
card; the software need not be modified. While the ship is underway, a BIU could be connected to
this channel, and the required interface protocol software could be downloaded. NAVMACS V2/V3
would then be interfaced with GateGuard as shown in Figure 3. Message entry for NAVMACS V2
transmission on the CUDIXS Link would be handled like the current method. The NAVMACS
operator would enter TRA TR2, and the GaleGuard operator would then initiate the message
transfer to NAVMACS via the BIU. Message entry from NAVMACS V3 would be accomplished
by using the LOD MSG TR2 RELAY command from any KVDT. Message distribution to
GateGuard could be accomplished by modifying the NAVMACS V2/V3 software to send all
addressed messages to both PRl and TP2. Message distribution may also be accomplished by having
the shore station add a Plain Language Address (PLA) to the NAVMACS Originator Screening List
(OSL) for all fleet broadcast and CUDIXS messages. The NAVMACS V2/V3 operator can then
take TP1 down, which altroutes the messages lo TP2 (GateGuard) for distribution to a LAN. The
GateGuard terminal should be localed inside ihe Main Communication Center (MAIN COMM),
as, NAVMACS cannot control the security level for messages sent to TP2. Responsibility for primary
delivery of addressed messages would still remain with the line printer connected to the NAVMACS
V2/V3 system. While the ship is in port, NAVMACS V2/V3 could receive over-the-counter service
via a shore AST connection. The BIU would then be downloaded with the AST interface protocol
software.
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3. NAVMACS V2/V3/V5/V5A Universal Serial Interface. A PC with the required serial interface
boards can be connected to any NAVMACS system. Software capable of handling all the required
functions could then be downloaded and run under Windows. Because GatcGuard does not currently
provide these features, the PC program would have to be developed using commercial off-the-shelf
software when possible. The NAVMACS Universal Serial Interface (NUSI) concept would at a
minimum provide windows for the Control Teletype (CTTY), KVDT, paper tape reader/punch,
diskette message entry/storage interface, LAN, shore AUTODIN connection, and remote system
interface. Each serial interface connection would be assigned a window for monitoring and control.
Access to each window would be provided by the host PC. The functions provided by each window
would be limited to the existing services that each interface currently provides (e. g the CTTY
window would be used for NAVMACS V2 command entry/system response). One major advantage
to this proposed solution is that it overcomes the message entry problem which occurs when an
operator enters TRA TR2 on the CTTY or LOD MSG TR2 RELAY from a NAVMACS V3
KVDT. When the operator enters TRA TR2 in the CTTY window, the program could initiate the
input message transfer immediately because it also controls the message entry to/from NAVMACS














Figure 3 NAVMACS V2/V3 and Gateguard interface
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3. Syncrotech Corporation Conclusions
The Syncrotech report final conclusions stated that GateGuard can be connected to any
NAVMACS system provided that the BIU interface protocol can be changed to accommodate each
system. Additionally, changes to the NAVMACS interface handlers to emulate the required transfer
protocol for the BIU interface are restricted by memory limitations. NAVMACS V2/V3 software must
be changed to provide distribution to a device (1/0 channel) other than PR1 and PR2 unless the
concepts outlined by Syncrotech are utilized. [Ref. 17]
C. SHORE COMMAND INTERFACE
Naval Communications Detachment, Cheltenham, Maryland, the Naval command responsible for
maintaining the NAVMACS family software, currently has a GateGuard computer linked to their
servicing LDMX using a Bit Interface Card (BIC) to replace a BIU. In other words they are using an
inboard circuit board to replace an outboard box. The protocol used between LDMX and GateGuard
is not supported by NAVMACS. Software in the BIC will have to be modified to support NAVMACS
V5 remote terminal protocol. To date, no further progress has been made in connecting GateGuard to
NAVMACS. [Ref. IS]
D. NAVMACS II
Director, Space and Electronic Warfare (OP-094), is the principal advisor to the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) concerning command and control matters, and is responsible for ensuring optimum
use of Navy Information systems |Ref. 19). OP-094 is currently strongly pursuing a program to
replace the NAVMACS variants with NAVMACS II. Hardware for this system would be acquired from
a Command and Control Workstation. Initially this uses the Desk Top Computer Contract 2 (DTC-2).
Initial design uses a SUN workstation with VME bus SPARC technology. The hardware would be
designed and implemented to accommodate upgrades every eighteen to twenty-four months. Software
utilizes the UNIX operating system, and application programs will be written in C and Ada. This system
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has an ETHERNET interface, so connectivity to remote terminals on a LAN is planned. However, the
driving force to replace NAVMACS variants is to replace the maintenance-expensive UYK-20's and 44s
and to obtain a system that can support higher speed ship-shore links. An overview of NAVMACS II
can be seen in Figure 4. The schedule for deployment of this prototype system is ambitious and
scheduled for April of 1992. Plans are to deploy the system battlegroup by battlegroup, which means
literally dismantling the system on an individual ship within one battlegroup and installing it on another
ship in a different battlegroup. Although the NAVMACS 11 specifically intends to interface with a LAN,
little attention has been given to security issues. |Rcf. 20]
NAVMACS II
• REMOVE UNNECESSARY EQUIPMENT/REDUCE ONBOARD
EQUIPMENT COUNT
REDUCE OPERATOR AND MAINTAINER WORKLOADS
BUILDS ON EXISTING FUNCTIONALITY
Figure 4 NAVMACS II overview
32
E. ASSESSMENT
As discussed in Chapter I, any viable shipboard LAN must be capable of integrating the ship's
message center. The first step to accomplish this was taken by having Syncrotech research the feasibility
of connecting NAVMACS with a GateGuard computer. Unfortunately no further progress has been
made due to the desire to acquire the NAVMACS II variant and, in the author's opinion, the lack of
a Navy Command entity pushing to get the task accomplished. Regardless of the NAVMACS variant,
the issue of routing various classifications of messages on a shipboard LAN has not been addressed. The
state of world affairs and the subsequent declining US Defense budget may delay the acquisition of
NAVMACS II. The recommendation of Syncrotech to modify the NAVMACS V2 and V3 operating
system should be pursued to furlher the progress towards a multilevel secure shipboard LAN. The
Syncrotech focus on the NAVMACS V5 system also confirms the author's opinion that only large ships,
such as aircraft carriers and heavy amphibious assault ships will benefit from any further progress. NCTS
provided Syncrotech with a listing of Afloat Automated Telecommunications systems for which they
were responsible for maintaining the appropriate software operating programs. The commands included
Coast Guard units as well as several Marine Corps commands. The list was qualified as being subject
to change due to various fleet upgrades and ship decommissioning. Regardless, the figures are apparent
that the primary NAVMACS variant in use is the NAVMACS V2. Of the 402 commands listed, the
breakdown of NAVMACS variants is as follows: NAVMACS V5/V5A: 28, NAVMACS V3: 69,
NAVMACS V2: 266, NAVMACS VI: 50. Admittedly, larger commands with NAVMACS V5 process
more message traffic; however, it may be prudent to pursue a multilevel secure LAN on a NAVMACS
V2 or V3 ship where quality control could be more easily accomplished and lessons learned provided
to benefit implementation on larger ships. Simply stated, it would be easier to evaluate a multilevel
secure LAN an a Guided Missile Cruiser with fewer nodes (easier initial physical security to monitor)
and less classified message traffic.
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IV. DEFENSE MESSAGE SYSTEM INITIATIVES
The targel architecture of the Defense Message System (DMS) is to provide electronic delivery
of messages between organizations and individuals in the DoD. AUTODIN currently provides message
service between organizational elements while the DDN E-Mail provides message service between
individuals. Although both system provide messaging services to DoD users, they are currently not
interoperable. DMS consists of hardware, software, procedures, facilities, and personnel involved in
transferring messages from writer to reader, except for the transmission systems providing connectivity,
such as the Defense Data Network (DDN) and base level transmission facilities. The DMS target
architecture will attempt to make AUTODIN and DDN E-Mail interoperable, therefore a baseline was
established consisting of AUTODIN, its baselevel support Telecommunications Centers (TCCs), and
E-Mail on the DDN, as they existed in September of 1989. This baseline, frozen in time for comparison
purposes, serves as the reference against which the future performance, costs, and manpower incurred
during the evolution of the targel architecture will be measured and compared. [Ref. 21]
DMS is not and will not be a network or a single supplier service. It is intended and foreseen that
DMS will be a multi-vendored combination of user-owned and managed equipment in combination with
user-leased services connected to DCS-owned and managed equipment. Interoperability and
standardization of these various equipments and services will be achieved by linking them together with
a common set of messaging (X.400) and directory (X.500) protocols. [Ref. 21: p. 1-2]
A. BACKGROUND
Previous efforts to modernize the DoD's messaging capabilities were terminated in January of
1988 by the Assistant Secretary of Defense Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD
C3I) due to blunders. A multi-service and Agency Defense Message System Working Group (DMSWG)
was then established to assess the DoD's messaging systems future. The goal was to improve the current
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system's functionality, survivability, and security while concurrently reducing costs, staffing, and
maintenance services. [Ref. 21: p. 1-1]
Through 1988, a recommended architecture and the phases for transitioning from the baseline
to the target system were developed and approved. In August of 1988, the Under Secretary for
Acquisition issued DMS program guidance assigning the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) the
overall coordination responsibilities for the DMS program. The guidance provided a phased
implementation strategy, a test and evaluation strategy along with conceptual approval of the target
architecture. On November 2, 1989, ASD C3I issued a policy for transition to the DMS target
architecture, mandating all services/agencies to develop and maintain their own DMS transition plans
which detail the evolution of the base level and regional messaging facilities to the DMS target
architecture. [Ref. 21: p. 1-1]
B. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY TRANSITION PLAN
The Department of the Navy (DON) implementation of the DMS will be evolutionary and is
being conducted in three phases. Phase I, 1989-1994, centers on the automation of existing TCC
functions, the extension of message services lo the user, and migrating AUTODIN data pattern traffic
to the DDN. AUTODIN and DDN E-Mail will continue lo exist as separate but interoperable systems
at the end of Phase I. In Phase II, 1995-2000, the TCCs will begin to be phased out and the X.400 and
X.500 protocols will become available. Base user desk-top workstations, connected via BITS, will provide
base-wide connectivity. Planned Message Security Protocol (MSP) components will be embedded in the
user workstation to permit secure messaging throughout DoD. Phase III, estimated for completion by
the year 2008, will implement the final DMS target architecture. The ultimate goal of this final phase
is to provide end-to-end Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) connectivity. [Ref. 22]
Phase I implementation is currently ongoing in a strong and steady manner. This phase primarily
involves shore commands and their servicing Navy Telecommunications Centers (NTCCs).
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1. Navy Telecommunications Centers
Presently, NTCCs provide DON users with access to AUTODIN and offer over-the-
counter (OTC) message services. Organizations which include ships in port and Naval shore commands
(defined as subscribers), exchange messages with their servicing NTCC via the manual, manpower
intensive, laborious OTC procedure. These procedures include manual distribution decisions on
incoming messages as well as paper reproduction and manual collation of multiple page messages. The
NTCC is said to either guard or protect for these subscribers. The term "guard" means that the NTCC
provides internal office distribution to specified subscribers. The term "protect" specifies the NTCC to
provide only a set number of copies to the subscriber, which arranges for its own internal distribution.
Currently NTCC systems include LDMX, SRT, and RIXTs, which were defined and described in
Chapter III. NAVCOMPARS, also described in Chapter II, provides communication links between
underway ships and AUTODIN. Although outside the scope of DMS, the NAVCOMPARS must evolve
to interface to the new DMS messaging service. [Ref. 22: p. E4]
It is the DMS Phase I implementation that is most applicable to the shipboard
environment, and this phase where technology and lessons learned can be utilized in developing a
shipboard LAN capable of fully integrating the ship's communication center. Chapter III discussed
Syncrotech Corporation's investigation into connecting NAVMACS to GaleGuard. The author has
deducted that the tasking for the investigation was prompted by the DMS Phase 1 implementation at
certain NTCCs and shore commands.
With the goal of providing writer-to-readcr messaging, the implementation of the DMS
in the DON will eliminate messages using paper media between the user organization and the NTCC.
DMS Phase I will utilize the Navy Standard Teleprinter Ashore (NSTA) to satisfy requirements for low-
cost message terminals, replacing teletype, Optical Character Readers (OCRs), and punched card/tape
equipment. The NSTA allows a Personal Computer Message Terminal (PCMT) to exchange traffic with
the NTCC using diskettes. Although the exchange of diskettes requires couriers (over-the-counter
service), the implementation eliminates the use of paper, OCRs, and card punches, facilitating easier
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message handling at the NTCC. The use of GateGuard provides electrical connectivity to the NTCC
(with the LDMX) using the KERMIT protocol. As described in Chapter III, GateGuard is linked to the
user's organization Office Automation System (OAS). GateGuard ensures that traffic electronically
received from the NTCC does not exceed the classification level of the OAS. The implementation of
common procedures and central accountability for organizational message receipt establishes a
certification boundary between the DON and the DCA. Initially, GateGuard has only supported
electrical message transfer from the NTCC to the OAS. When approved release authentication
technologies or procedures are implemented on the OAS, a two way GateGuard exchange will be
allowed. [Ref. 22: pp. 3-2 to 3-3]
Currently, most organizational OASs run at the unclassified level. Higher classified LANs
exist, but normally run on a system high level concept, which was discussed in Chapter II. Separate
GateGuard are required for unclassified messages passed to the OAS and for classified messages printed
or written to diskette for manual dissemination. If a certified multilevel secure LAN exists, only one
GateGuard will be required. The Navy DMS transition plan calls for pursuit of accreditation for a single
GateGuard capable of segregating messages by classification. [Ref. 22: pp. 3-3 to 3-4]
The Phase I plan also includes the implementation of a Multilevel Mail Server (MMS) that
will provide dedicated and dial-up GateGuard interfaces to user electronic mail boxes at the NTCC. The
MMS will allow the exchange of message traffic classified up to SECRET. Additionally, a network of
MMSs is being planned to phase out the use of AUTODIN. The MMS network, interconnecting MMSs
via the Defense Integrated Secure Network (D1SNET), will handle AUTODIN message traffic between
Naval commands served by the MMS. [Ref. 22: p. E6]
MMS will be discussed in greater detail below; however a brief overview of security
services from [Ref. 22] is considered appropriate because it may provide some points for comparison
when reviewing shipboard options.
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2. Security Services Provided
Present DON NTCCs systems have not been formally evaluated in accordance with the
DoD directives discussed in Chapter II. The systems are certified by the Naval Telecommunications
Integration Center (NAVTELSYSIC) and accredited by Commander, Naval Computer and
Telecommunications Command. Additionally, all NTCC systems undergo DCA certification before
connecting to AUTODIN. All communication links to the AUTODIN are encrypted using the KG
family of encryption devices. The DDN is currently segregated into the M1LNET for unclassified service
and the three other networks are for classified material. Each classified network carries only one security
level, SECRET on DISNET 1, TOP SECRET on DISNET 2, and TOP SECRET/ SPECIAL
COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI) on DISNET 3. Intentions are to merge the three
separate networks into one network, the DISNET. Physically unprotected trunks and host access lines
on the MILNET are being link encrypted using KG-84As. A Low-cost Encryption and Authentication
Device (LEAD) is planned to provide link encryption on MILNET terminals. On the classified systems,
KG-84A devices are used for link encryption of physically unprotected trunks, host access lines, and
terminal access lines. BLACKER, providing end-lo-end link encryption is beginning to be implemented
on the three DISNETS. [Ref. 22: pp. 3-36 to 3-37]
C. MULTILEVEL MAIL SERVER
The objective of the Multilevel Mail Server (MMS) project is to provide the capability of
electronically exchanging various classified organizational messages between NTCCs LDMX and its
over-the-counter subscribers. This will be accomplished with dial-up interfaces between a subscribers
GateGuard to subscribers mailboxes within the MMS. The initial MMS will be installed at NTCC
Cheltenham, Maryland to aid in defining configuration requirements and operational procedures needed
for fielding at other sites. Specific goals for the MMS project include [Ref. 23]:
• Provide Gateguard with connectivity to the TCC
• Provide extended storage for organizations not operating on a 24 hour basis
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• Provide message separation by classification
• Provide low cost secure dial-up connectivity
• Eliminate LDMX port availability contention
• Eliminate over-the-counter processing of Unclassified to Secret AUTODIN messages
• Provide the connectivity for receipt and transmission of AUTODIN messages via diskette or the
subscriber OAS.
1. MMS General Operating Overview
The LDMX will segregate subscriber's message traffic by classification to separate circuits
for the MMS. Three circuits will be provided, one each for Unclassified, Confidential, and Secret
messages. After processing the messages from the LDMX, the MMS will post the messages to
separately segregated subscriber accounts that have been programmed into the MMS Alias file. The
MMS will determine the correct mailbox account for each message received by reading a predefined
and pre-formatted Routing Indicator (RI) from the established formal line and field of the message.
[Ref. 23: p. 2-3]
Subscribers will access the MMS from their installed GateGuard systems and Secure
Telephone Unit III (STU-II1) using the public telephone network. When subscribers access the MMS,
they will be able to download messages wailing for them. MMS will download messages that are
classified at the classification level that was accessed. The MMS will allow subscribers to download
messages that are classified at lower classification levels than that level used to access the MMS,
provided the subscriber had previously notified the NTCC of the requirement to download messages of
multiple classifications during one login session. Higher classification levels than the one that is used to
access the MMS will not be able to be downloaded. [Ref. 23: p. 2-3]
a. The MMS Processor
The AT&T 3B2/600G minicomputer available from the Standard Multi-user Small
Computer Requirements Contract (SMSCRC) will be used as the MMS processor. The computer will
operate at 24 MHz and contain a minimum of 32 MBytes of Random Access Memory (RAM). It will
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be equipped with a multi-processor board which will support off-loading many of the less important
system functions to itself thereby providing more time for the main processor to perform the primary
system functions. The system was also designed to accommodate future expansion of the MMS
requirements through system upgrades. [Ref. 23: pp. 3-7 to 3-8]
b. MMS Operating System
The MMS processor will initially run release 3.2.3.30 of the UNIX System V/MLS
operating system which was specifically designed for the 3B2/600G. The operating system is designed
to meet the TCB level of Bl, however it is not yet certified by NCSC. The operating system's
predecessor is currently certified at the Bl level, and because the new version is simply an extension of
the certified release it is expected the new release will be certified prior to installation at Cheltenham.
The system V/MLS TCB is protected from modification by non-administrative users through mandatory
and discretionary access control. The system will be used in a multi-user mode. [Ref. 23: p. 3-11]
2. Selected MMS Detailed Operating Characteristics
The MMS will provide on-line access for the electronic exchange of AUTODIN messages
between the NTCC's LDMX and a subscriber's GaleGuard. Two way transfer of messages, from the
LDMX to the GateGuard, and from the GaleGuard to the LDMX is the ultimate goal. The MMS is
the interface between the two systems and requires the capability to communicate with both, while
concurrently separating messages by classification. [Ref. 23: p. 3-16]
The MMS will utilize V/MLS Secure Mail Package to enable the system to work; in the
author's opinion, a similar package will be an integral part of a future shipboard MLS LAN. The E-mail
package of the MMS V/MLS Operating System is mandatory and must be included in the final Bl
certification. The secure mail package provides a repository for messages received from both the LDMX
and from the subscriber's GateGuard. [Ref. 23: p. 3-11]
Each subscriber organization will have mailbox accounts established within the MMS and
individual messages will be posted to separate class-marked mailboxes. After determining appropriate
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distribution upon receiving the message from the LDMX the MMS E-mail system will append an E-mail
header to the message and post it to the appropriate mailbox account which is determined by the
specific subscriber to which the message is addressed and the classification of the message. The E-mail
header is removed when the message is transferred to and from the LDMX or GateGuard, depending
on which way the transmission is initiated. The E-mail header is only used for the internal processing
within the MMS. Figure 5 demonstrates message flow procedures from the LDMX to the Gateguard.
The process for message flow from a GateGuard to the LDMX is opposite of that shown in Figure 5,













































Figure 5 Message flow procedures from LDMX to Gateguard
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MMS utilizes an RIXT protocol conversion to make the MMS appear to be an RIXT to
the LDMX. Besides converting the protocol, the process will ensure that the classification link between
the LDMX and the MMS is not exceeded. Messages will be delivered to both the LDMX and the
Gateguard by First in First Out (FIFO) precedence. |Ref. 23: p. 3-21
1
a. Access Control and Authentication
Access to the MMS will be controlled by a MLS Operating System. Subscribers must
be capable of presenting identification and authentication (password) information that is recognized by
the MMS TCB. The ID and password will map to mailbox accounts and, in conjunction with the security
of the data port used to access the MMS, to a security level the subscriber is authorized to access. [Ref.
23: p. 3-24]
STU-III's with a STU-II1 Access Control System (SACS) will be used to provide
synchronous dial-up communications between the GateGuard and MMS over the public telephone
switched network. SACS will authenticate subscribers prior to gaining access to the MMS through a
feature which provides affirmative authentication of a specific user by Key ID and/or Department
Agency or Organization (DAO) code. SACS will be maintained and updated by system operators at the
NTCC. SACS will prevent the calling party from establishing a link if the calling party is not listed on
the access control list within SACS. Separate telephone numbers will be provided for each of the three
message classifications. [Ref. 23: p. 3-24J Figure 6 provides an overview of MMS interfaces.
b. Support Software Environment
The Secure Mail Package must be compatible with the System V/MLS operating
system. The intended database management system to be utilized is the UNIFY 2000, along with the
PRELUDE office automation system. These and any other compiled software application programs
must be compatible with the operating system. It is not anticipated that this will be a problem because
the mentioned systems are available through the SMSCRC commodities contract which is the contract
vehicle for the procurement of the software and hardware for the MMS. (Ref. 23: p. 4-4]
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< MODIFIED ACP 126
Figure 6 MMS interfaces
D. MESSAGE DISSEMINATION SUBSYSTEM
As stated previously DMS is a system in the sense that its components work together to perform
a function, it is the result of many separate development and acquisition activities. The Message
Dissemination Subsystem (MDS) is one oi these components and is being implemented in a non-
DCS/NTS Automated Information (A1S) supporting DoD messaging. |Rcf. 24]
1. MDS Objectives
The MDS system is designed to provide a system to automate organizational messaging
handling procedures. The system was deigned based on the following objectives [Ref. 24: p. 3):
• To eliminate manual message dissemination procedures requiring message reproduction and
courier services.
• To operate at the system high security level of an organization's LAN and ADP systems.
43
• To require that all user terminals be IBM PC compatible with a connecting LAN and file server.
• To implement file server and user terminal software that is POSIX and MS-DOS compatible.
• To provide file transfer of messages in accordance with Navy formats, transparent to the
operating environment.
• To use X.400/X.500 compatible design considerations permitting upgrade through commercial
operating/network system enhancements.
• To use COTS equipment and systems software to lake advantage of technology advancements
in the area of office automation.
• To migrate using COTS and Non-Developmental items evolutionary implementation to the
Government Open Systems Interconnection Profile (GOSIP).
2. Functional Description
The MDS will electronically send, receive and disseminate messages by utilizing a PC
LAN. MDS is designed to accept input from standard diskette or Autodin messages from GateGuard.
Additionally, MDS is capable of disseminating inter-office memos, individual DDN E-mail, and an
organizational message summary. The distribution of organizational messages is the focus of this thesis,
consequently attention will only be focused on the organizational message dissemination capabilities of
MDS.
Basic components of the MDS include [Ref. 24: p. 17]:
• PC LAN - A PC LAN and file server will provide the medium for the electronic distribution of
organizational message traffic.
• The Message Dissemination Subsystem File Server (MDSFS) - is the component of MDS that
will be resident on the file server. This file server will allow the distribution of incoming or back-
routed outgoing organizational messages to the AIS users.
• The MDS User Interface Program (MDSUIP) - is the component which allows access to the
organizational message files created by the MDSFS. The MDSUIP will allow a user to select and
view an organizational message.
• Marine Corps Text Format Editor (MTF Editor) - The MTF Editor is user PC software that
allows a user to create, format, edit, and output an organizational message in accordance with
required DoD message formats.
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a. MDSFS Message Input and Queuing
The MDSFS will receive formatted message via GateGuard (utilizing the KERMIT
protocol) or from floppy diskette and copy them to a directory in the MDSFS file server. As specified
by the user, the MDSFS will poll the directory and when messages are present the MDSFS distribution
process will begin. Distribution entails automatically searching the message for key information.
Messages addressed to Navy shore commands require the originator to include office code routing
indicators in the format of the message, thus the key information could be very easy to obtain. Once
receiving user offices have been identified, a temporary log will be updated to facilitate distribution
processing. Each user work station will have a message summary file in their PC LAN file server. The
summary will contain records of organizational messages that have been distributed by the MDSFS. As
new messages are received they will be appended to the user's message summary. [Rel. 24: p. 30]
b. MDSUIP Message Selection and Delivery
The MDSUIP component of the MDS is the user workstation software. It provides
the user with a method of scanning and sorting messages waiting for inspection or action. Users will
access their respective message summary file to review messages awaiting their inspection. The database
records will include critical information about the message, such as the Originator, Date-Time-Group,
subject, classification, and precedence. The database will be reviewed in a summary line format allowing
the user to view characteristics of more than twenty message simultaneously. When the user selects the
message for viewing, the MDSUIP will retrieve the message from the common message directory for
viewing. The file will not be copied but only read into the user workstation's memory. Users will not
have a write capability to the original message. This intended to preserve message integrity; however,
a user may request the path and file name of the message. |Ref. 24: p. 33]
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V. TRUSTED XENIX AND VERDIX SECURE LOCAL AREA NETWORK
The purpose of this chapter is to describe two products that are commercially available today.
The author chose the Trusted XENIX and Verdix Secure LAN because they are two products that have
been formally evaluated by the NCSC to meet B2 criteria. The primary references that support this
chapter consists of company literature that does not disclose proprietary information. One must
remember that the literature is primarily used to sell the individual products; however the author is only
referencing literature that provides a functional description of the two products. The formal NCSC
evaluation justifies the presentation of these two products. The author is not endorsing any of the
products, but only desires to review the capabilities to demonstrate how they may be applied to a
shipboard multilevel secure LAN.
Trusted Information Systems produces Trusted XENIX, a trusted operating system that controls
information access to specific individuals and the network from the workstation. Verdix Secure LAN
(VSLAN) components control the How of information lo each network component (e.g., server,
workstation, gateway, printer). Coupled with software, integration of the two products allows for the
exchange of compatible security labels, providing a MLS solution to many requirements.
[Ref. 25]
A. TRUSTED XENIX
Trusted XENIX is a multilevel secure operating system for IBM Personal Computers and fully
compatible clones. The Trusted XENIX System consists of three components. The Trusted Xenix
Operating System is the base component and a prerequisite for the other components. The operating
system performs several functions which include: enforcing mandatory and discretionary security policies,
performing user identification and authentication, generating audit trail and accounting records, and
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providing a base to build secure application programs. The second component, the Trusted Xenix
Development System, provides a set of application development software tools, including the C
programming language. The Trusted Xenix Text Formatting System is the third component and provides
high-level formatting macros for document preparation. [Ref. 26]
1. Environmental Strengths
Trusted Xenix enforces a least privileged user principle, allowing each user to perform only
those functions required to perform their respective tasks. Normal user functions include tasks such as
running application software, creating and deleting their files, and using editors. There are five different
privileged user roles in addition to the normal users. They include a System Security Administrator,
Secure Operator, Account Administrator, and a Trusted System Programmer and Auditor. One person
may fulfill the role of more than one function; however, they can only act in one capacity per login
session. A wide range of auditing capabilities are available, including all actions taken by privileged
users. [Ref. 26]
2. Communications Support
Separate from the operating system software, Trusted Information Systems also offers a
communication software package. This software includes three network TCP/IP applications, single
network TCP/IP, dual network TCP/IP, and Multilevel TCP/IP, each targeted towards different
consumers with specific security needs to meet their LAN configurations. Additionally, a Multilevel
STU-III software package is included in the software package. By utilizing this communications package,
the Trusted XENIX user can communicate with an unlimited number of users. The TCP/IP programs
provide a fully capable set of standard protocols including [Ref. 26]:
• Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) - provides reliable data transfer between computers.
• Internet Protocol (IP) - enables data to be transferred across networks using different
technologies, e.g. X.25 and IEEE 802.3.
• File Transfer Protocol (FTP) - transfers files between computers.
• Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) - sends and receives mail between computers.
• Telnet Protocol - provides for login on remote computer systems.
The Multilevel STU-I1I Software automates the setting of the Trusted XENIX security
level for the STU-II1 serial-port connection by using special security labels provided by the STU-II1
hardware device. This eliminates the possibility of operator error and allows for remote multilevel
security operations with STU-1I1 communications security protection. (Ref. 26]
B. VERDIX SECURE LOCAL AREA NETWORK
The VERDIX Secure LAN (VSLAN) is a network component that is capable of interconnecting
hosts systems operating at different security levels. The system mediates access between hosts, it does
not mediate access attempts to host processes to information on host systems. It is intended to be used
as a trusted building block upon which complete trusted network systems can be built. [Ref. 27]
The VSLAN was developed to provide the following services to its hosts [Ref. 27]:
• A system bus interface.
• A datagram-orientated communications service.
• Mediation of all data transfers between attached hosts in accordance with the VSLAN mandatory
and discretionary access control policies.
• Identification and authentication of the individual responsible for operating a node of the
network.
• Centralized management functions for security officers to exercise control over the operation of
VSLAN.
• A capability to protect host datagrams and VSLAN control information against modification by
random transmission errors.
The VSLAN supports the Ethernet/IEEE 802.3 protocol and provides backplane compatibility
with most microcomputers, minicomputers, and workstations including PC-Bus (286/386 PCs), VMEbus
(i.e., SUN workstations), 3B2 Bus (AT&T 3B2), and NuBus (Apple MAC II). The system also includes
an eight port terminal server that supports TCP/IP and Telnet protocols. VSLAN is transparent to host




The VSLAN implements a Network TCB distributed over a LAN of various host systems
and interface components. The Network TCB provides interconnectivity between user systems according
to a defined security policy, and performs access control, identification, authentication and audit.
Enforcement of the user's defined security policy is accomplished by hardware, software, and firmware
built into the system. The desired security policy is input via parameters by the Network Security Officer
(NSO). The NSC) is the individual responsible for administering security on the network. [Ref. 27]
A secure LAN consists of a single VERDIX Network Security Center (VNSC) and
multiple Verdix Network Security Devices (VNSDs), which are very similar to the TlUs discussed in
Chapter II. The VNSC provides the capabilities for the NSO to control and audit security aspects of the
network. The VNSD is the LAN interface that addresses functional areas of access control, encryption
and communications. The VNSD mediates incoming and outgoing packets based on the defined security
parameters implemented by the NSO through the VNSC. [Ref. 27]
a. The Verdix Network Security Center
The VNSC manages the security operations of the VSLAN. The VNSC is a dedicated
workstation which includes secure network management software and a built in secure LAN interface.
The VNSC generates authentication keys for network initialization and communicates transmit and
receive security policies for users of the LAN. Additionally, the VNSC maintains audit trails of network
activity and generates audible and visual alarms when security violation attempts occur. [Ref. 27]
The VNSC programs a Personal Identification Device (PID) for each user. The users
communicate an initialization request to the VNSC by inserting their PID in the VNSD key receptacle.
The VNSC then authenticates the trusted VNSD, and alerts if the initialization fails authentication.
Proper authentication establishes a trusted path of communication between the VNSC and the VNSD.
The VNSC then downloads the data access rules to the VNSD. These data access rules define "security
windows" through which data can be received or transmitted consistent with the predefined security
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policy. The windows define the levels and categories of data which can be received and transmitted. The
"receive security window" defines data the node can receive from the LAN; and the "transmit window"
defines the data the node may transmit to the LAN. Complete audit trails are maintained on all security-
related events. The software for VNSC includes all system and application software required for network
and security management. The software cannot be modified by the user. The VNSC is a specially
configured computer equipped with audible alarms. It also includes a VGA monitor and audit printer.
The VNSC interfaces directly to the IEEE Ethernet/802.3 LAN. [Ref. 27]
b. The Verdix Network Security Device
The Verdix Network Security Device (VNSD) is the secure interface to the VSLAN.
It is a trusted interface that functions as a multilevel, multi-compartment component and mediates the
flow of data between LAN nodes. The VNSD enforces the network security policy by verifying every
attempted data transfer against the data access rules implemented by the VNSC. The VNSD checks that
the security label of the data is consistent with both the transmit and receive windows. All data not
satisfying the transmit and receive security checks are rejected and the VNSC is alerted to the attempted
violation. [Ref. 27]
The VNSD hardware is available in several board-level configurations. They are
functionally identical, yet each provides for a different host bus interface. The VNSD contains a
communication interface, data separation kernel, authentication key interface, encryption hardware,
processor, and memory for the VNSD program and data. Interaction between the modules is performed
via a local address/data bus driven by the master processor and Ethernet blocks. The VNSD is driven
by the 16-bit Intel 80286 microprocessor and uses the Intel 82586 micro-controller to provide IEEE
802.3 media access. The board's RAM is divided into three banks. One dual ported memory bank is
shared with the CPU and the host, and one is shared between the CPU and the Ethernet module. The
remaining RAM is reserved for local memory for the VNSD CPU module. Each of the modules is
logically separated and can only be accessed through the appropriate modules. |Ref. 27]
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The software for ihe VNSD was developed by VERD1X and is stored as firmware
on its board. The firmware executes all of the VNSD's functions, including enforcing security policy,
transmitting and receiving data, auditing, encrypting, and initializing. [Ref. 27]
2. Communication Protocols
The VSLAN operates at the physical and data link layers of the Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI)- Basic Reference Model. VSLAN utilizes the IEEE 802.3 protocols to handle the
physical layer and a portion of the data link layer. The VERDIX implementation differs from the IEEE
standard in one respect; the IEEE standard defines a two-byte length field, which indicates the length
of the datagram. VERDIX uses this field to identify the source VNSD ID or principal ID (depending
on whether a data or control association has been established). A specific length indicator is not
included in the datagram. Instead, the receiving VNSD determines the end of the datagram by the
quiescence of the line. It strips off the last 32 bits of the received message for comparison, and is able
to determine the end of the data field. The "CSMA/CD Access Method and Physical Layer
Specification," IEEE 802.3, does not require acknowledgement transmissions to indicate that datagrams
have been received. [Ref. 27]
The protocols residing at VSLAN data link layer include the IEEE 802.3 Media Access
Control protocol, an encryption protocol, and a logical link protocol. Except for the length of the data
field, VSLAN Media access protocol conforms to the IEEE standard. Because of the need for reliable
communication between the VNSC and the VNSD, the VSLAN protocol suite includes a logical link
control protocol. This protocol provides a reliable data transfer service for network control datagrams
only. This ia accomplished by specifying separate data and acknowledgement datagrams. The receiver
accepts only datagrams in sequence and generates acknowledgements that identify the received
datagrams by sequence number. Packets prepared by the logical link protocol are treated as data by the
encryption protocol. The Data Encryption Standard (DES), described in Chapter II, is primarily used
as a data integrity mechanism, instead of a mechanism to control security policy. [Ref. 27]
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The VSLAN operates transparently to higher layer protocols (e.g., X.25) implemented on
hosts. Because of its independence from these upper layer protocols the VSLAN system can be used
to integrate a variety of host systems. Even though the VSLAN can support communications between
different host systems, host systems must implement compatible upper layer protocols suites to be able
to communicate with one another. |Ref. 27]
C. SUMMARY
The above information provides a brief overall description of two commercial products that have
met formal DoD evaluation criteria. The XENIX operating system provides MLS for the host while the
VERDIX Secure LAN provides for the security and proper routing of information across the LAN














Figure 7 Example of VERDIX secure local area network
VI. A MULTILEVEL SECURE SHIPBOARD LAN PROPOSAL
The purpose of this chapter is to present a hypothetical multilevel secure shipboard LAN
installation using the MMS, the MDS, the XENIX Trusted Operating System and the VERDIX Secure
Local Area Network, described in the previous chapters. The hypothetical LAN will be based on the
requirements of a medium-sized ship; a generic destroyer and/or cruiser scenario will be developed. By
generic the author is implying a general description of node location and desired classification processing
capabilities. Specific ships will differ due to their ADP assets (number and type of computers) and
command prerogative of how certain administrative processes will function (e.g., what nodes can process
Secret and below as opposed to Confidential and below). The generic ship description is developed from
the author's eight years of shipboard experience on four different ship classes which include one Frigate,
one Destroyer, and two Guided Missile Cruisers.
A. SHIPBOARD LOCAL AREA NETWORK OVERVIEW
The primary purpose of the hypothetical LAN is to provide the capability of processing various
classified organizational messages between the Main Communications Center, hereafter referred to as
Radio Central, and various nodes throughout the ship. The ultimate goal is the termination of message
paper reproduction for the internal distribution of AUTODIN messages throughout the ship (which
parallels a goal of the DMS with the NTCC and its OTC subscribers). The secondary goal is to provide
a medium to replace the paper-based Secret information account. Chapter One discussed the potential
use of CD-ROM techniques in distributing tactical information. The LAN should be designed for future
upgrades to incorporate this type of features as they become more readily available. The tertiary goal
is to provide the foundation for an Office Automation System allowing for various levels of security that
will conform to Privacy Act requirements. An example would be the generation of personnel evaluations
53
and subsequent processing, including reviewing and final approval, all conducted on the multilevel secure
LAN.
1. Specific Required Attributes
Specific attributes for the hypothetical LAN are somewhat parallel to those of the MMS,
described in Chapter IV, and include:
• Provide connectivity between NAVMACS, GateGuard, VNSC, and LAN nodes
• Provide message separation by classification
• Eliminate manual outgoing processing and incoming distribution of Unclassified to Secret
AUTODIN messages.
2. Functional System Description
The following is a system description of the hypothetical LAN which includes assumptions
concerning connectivity and compatibility of application programs. These will be highlighted as discussed.
The hypothetical LAN is based on systems which have been described in the previous chapters. The
intent is to draw upon existing developments and relate them to indicate that a multilevel shipboard
secure LAN is feasible.
a. Communications Suite and Interfaces
The communications suite of the ship is assumed to be the NAVMACS V3 variant.
The NAVMACS software will be modified to send all addressed messages to both PR1 and TP2. A BIU
or BIC is installed to connect NAVMACS to GateGuard. GateGuard has a communications port with
STU-III access to receive messages from the servicing NTCC while the ship is in port. GateGuard is
installed in the Radio Central which is either manned or physically locked and alarmed. The NAVMACS
interface simply allows incoming messages to be transferred to GateGuard in their DoD predefined
format (JANAP 128 or modified ACP 126).
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b. GaleGuard, MMS, and LAN Interfaces
GateGuard will be interfaced to a shipboard MMS. A method of emulating a STU-III
connection of the highest security level will have to be developed. This will allow the MMS to accept
Unclassified to Secret message traffic from the GateGuard during the same transfer. Otherwise, a
GateGuard capable of separating message traffic by classification will be required. Three ports would
carry the associated classified traffic. Essentially the GaleGuard would emulate the NTCC's LDMX
connection to the MMS.
A MDS system will be required upstream of the MMS to interrupt the message and
determine to which shipboard subscriber mailboxes the messages should be posted. The MMS at the
NTCC is able to read the DoD format of the message which includes the Plain Language Addressee
and associated Routing Indicator which every Navy command is assigned. This is how a subscriber
account is identified at the NTCC. At the shipboard level an application interface will be required to
read the message and determine which shipboard subscribers should receive the message. A shipboard
subscriber will have to be defined as an individual node or an organizational title position within the
command, such as Commanding Officer or Executive Officer. The application program would modify
or append a local shipboard Rl to the message that the MMS would recogni/.e. Another option is to
simply post all messages of the same classification to one subscriber account and then allow authorized
nodes access to the files within the account. The MMS would then append the E-mail header to the
DoD formatted message and post it to a subscriber's mailbox as it is currently programmed to do at the
NTCC. A MDS system would then poll each subscriber mailbox and generate a message summary
profile allowing subscribers to review critical information about messages posted to their respective
mailbox accounts or all messages contained in a designated classification mailbox. The MMS would then
be fitted with a VNSD on three communication ports connected to the shipboard LAN (one each for
Unclassified, Confidential, and Secret).
Another option is a single communication port with one VNSD since the VNSC can
program communication authorization between various VNSDs. The VNSD would be equivalent to the
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STU-III and SACS, being programmed with transmit windows for each node and providing encryption
capability the STU-III provides. The VNSC would be installed in the Radio Central and the NSO would
program the required transmit and receive windows for each node. Another way of describing the
author's proposal is that the MMS would function as a file server for the LAN. Files and messages with
the E-mail header (the E-mail header would not be required to be stripped off as it is in the MMS
NTCC configuration) would be posted in mailbox accounts, and if a node is authorized to communicate
with the mailbox a file transfer or E-mail transfer could take place.
A MDSUIP would be incorporated to provide the capability for viewing messages
selected from the message summary profile. The file will be read to the user workstation memory for
viewing. If the user desires a copy of the message a file transfer will be required. Assuming the VNSC
and VNSD are installed and programmed, an authorized file transfer will take place and the
responsibility for providing multilevel security at the workstation will be transferred to the XENIX
trusted operating system. This assumes the MDSUIP is compatible with the VERDIX and XENIX
software.
3. Nodes
The hypothetical LAN will consist of the following nodes, generic location, and security
classification processing requirements:
1. Commanding Officer's In Port Cabin - located in the Commanding Officer's in port cabin,
required to process Secret and below.
2. Executives Officer's stateroom - located in the Executive Officer's stateroom, required to process
Secret and below.
3. Administrative Office - located in the Administrative Office, required to process Secret and below.
4. Personnel Office - located in the Personnel Office, required to process Confidential and below.
5. Supply Departmental Office - located in the Supply Departmental office, two workstations may
be active, required to process Confidential and below.
6. Combat Systems Departmental Office - located in the Combat Systems Departmental Office,
required to process Secret and below.
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7. Operations' Departmental Office - located in the Operations' Departmental Office, required to
process Secret and below.
8. Engineering Departmental Office - located in the Engineering Log Room, required to process
Confidential and below.
9. Command Master Chiefs Office - located in the Command Master Chief Office, required to
process Confidential and below.
10. 3M Coordinator's/Ship's Maintenance Officer Office - located in the designated office space,
required to process Confidential and below.
11. Electronic Repair Shop - located in the Electronic Technicians' workspace, required to process
Confidential and below.
12. Main Communications Center (Radio Central) - located in Radio Central, required to process
Secret and below.
13. Combat Information Center ( Three separate workstations) - located in CJC, required to process
Secret and below.
14. Pilot House - located in the Pilot House, required la process Secret and below.
15. Various Officer staterooms - located throughout the ship, required to process Confidential and
below.
16. Various administrative offices - offices that certain ship configurations will allow depending on
space and command priority, examples include a Command Career Counselor office and an
Educational Services Officer office. Additionally these offices may coexist with an existing office but
require a separate node, an example would be the Command Career Counselor and Command
Master Chief sharing an office space but having two separate nodes within the same space.
4. Assumptions
The author has made certain assumptions in the theoretical LAN which include:
• The topology and transmission medium, coaxial cable or optical fiber, are physical characteristics
that support the LAN. Specific discussion and requirements have been intentionally omitted,
assuming that they will not limit the operation of the applications.
• Application processes described in the previous chapters will be compatible or be made
compatible with relatively easy effort.
• The MMS will act as the file server for the organization's messages. Other processes and
applications may be required to be installed to provide separate functions for the LAN. The
author has assumed the MMS has the capability to do this.




The following scenarios are provided to assist in understanding the application processes
the author has described.
a. Scenario One : Secret Message
A Secret message scenario is described below.
1. A Secret general service message is addressed to USS ONE and transmitted over the fleet
broadcast while the ship is underway. The NAVMACS V3 determines the message is addressed to
its ship from the user entered Command Guard List. The subject of the message is "Electronic
Warfare Alert." The message is received by NAVMACS and is downloaded to GaleGuard through
the BIU.
2. GaleGuard transfers the message lo MMS through the STU-1II emulation connection. The MMS
retrieves the message, appends ihe E-mail header for internal processing, and posts the message to
the command's Secret subscriber mailbox account.
3. The MDS polls the Secret mailbox account and recognizes the new message. Specific formal fields
are written to the message summary profile. The command's message summary profile is transmitted
to all nodes on the LAN. (The frequency of transmitting updated message summary profiles will be
input by the command system administrator.)
4. The Commanding Officer logs on to his PC in his stateroom. He inserts his PID into his node's
VNSD which identifies him as the Commanding Officer and his associated pre-programmed transmit
and receive windows. He reviews the message summary profile and desires to review the scenario's
message. THE MDSUIP requests the message be read to the Commanding Officer's node memory.
The VNSD on the MMS recognizes that the transmit and receive windows arc allowed for the Secret
classification and the message with the E-mail header appended is read into the memory of the CO's
computer. (The author has suggested leaving the E-mail header appended to allow for the feasibility
of utilizing the E-mail application program which may make it easier for application program
compatibility.) The CO reviews the message and desires a permanent copy of the message. He now
initiates a file transfer of the message. Again the VNSDs recognize that the communication process
is authorized and a file transfer is conducted. Once the file is received the Xenix operating system
recognizes the message classification and files the message in an appropriately protected area of the
computer memory through the implemented data base management system.
b. Scenario Two: Command Mandated Special Category Message
The purpose of this scenario is lo demonstrate the flexibility the proposed system
could offer. This scenario is predicated on the author's experience that individual Navy commands desire
to internally route certain Unclassified messages in accordance with the Commanding and Executive
Officers' prerogative.
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1. An Unclassified general message, without any Navy standard special handling instructions is
received by USS ONE. The ship is in port and the message was transferred to the ship's GateGuard
by the servicing area NTCC's MMS. The contents of the message include social security numbers
of personnel who tested positive for substance abuse from the command's most recent random
urinalysis. The Executive Officer has mandated that this type of message will only be delivered to
his MMS subscriber account due to previous incidents of unauthorized disclosure of similar message
results.
2. The MDS system recognizes the message by contents and subject line. The MDS interacts with
the MMS to post the message to the Executive Officer's individual subscriber account. Another
option is to utilize a manual MMS operator to screen all received messages and post them to
appropriate subscriber accounts.
3. The MDS later polls the Executive Officer's MMS subscriber account and generates a message
summary profile. The Executive Officer now has a unique message summary account and recognizes
that he wants his own file copy of this message.
4. He inserts his P1D into his node's VNSD and establishes a link with the MMS's VNSD. Both
VNSDs recognize thai transmission and receipt windows have been authorized and the requested
file transfer lakes place.
c. Scenario Three: All Navy Message
This scenario describes the routing of a message addressed lo all Navy commands,
commonly known as an ALNAV. Additionally, a MDS interface will be assumed not to exist. As
mentioned in the previous example a manual MMS operator will be employed. Although this scenario
does not eliminate human intervention in internal message routing procedures, it does offer an extreme
reduction in the number of personnel required to disseminate paper message traffic. This scenario
provides the possibility of an interim solution lo a shipboard multilevel secure LAN while a MDS/MMS
interface is developed.
1. An Unclassified ALNAV message is received by USS ONE while underway. The NAVMACS V3
is monitoring the fleet broadcast and determines that the message should be received by the ship.
NAVMACS downloads the ALNAV message lo GateGuard.
2. An MMS operator polls GateGuard for recently received messages. The GalcGuard transfers the
ALNAV to the MMS where the message is posied awaiting operator intervention to program specific
subscriber accounts lo which ihe message should be posied. The MMS operator reviews the message
and based on written routing guidance determines the message should be delivered lo all individual
subscriber accounts.
3. As individuals logon to their nodes through out the day they insert their PIDs and establish
communications with the MMS's VNSD. Again transmit and receive windows are recognized and
the individual subscriber accounts are downloaded to their respective nodes. (Measures would be
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required to prevent one node from downloading a large account and subsequently preventing other
users from utilizing the network.)
d. Scenario Four: Personnel Evaluations
This scenario describes the use of VSLAN without reference to a NAVMACS
communication interface. Its purpose is to show a feature of VSLAN multilevel security feature that is
not communications related, but requires multilevel security characteristics. The mandatory access
control policy that VSLAN employs mediates access between defined subjects and datagrams. Each
datagram has a unique sensitivity label associated with it indicating its security level. [Ref. 27] "A
security level is defined as the combination of a hierarchical classification and a set of non-hierarchical
categories that represents the sensitivity of information. The VSLAN supports up to 16 classifications
and 64 categories." [Ref. 27]
This means the network can be used for much more than providing a communication
medium for the three classifications of messages that NAVMACS would be authorized to download to
GateGuard. Administrative information could easily be classified and categorized as required or desired
by an individual ship. Evaluations are a prime example.
1. The regular annual evaluation reporting date for First Class Petty Officers is approaching and the
Executive Officer desires all draft evaluations to be submitted to his node for review and editing.
Certain nodes throughout the ship are programmed with transmit and receive windows corresponding
to the command's desired security and sensitivity policy. In this case the Executive Officer has
informed the NSO that he desires only departmental office nodes to communicate with him
regarding the subjects' evaluations.
2. A Chief Petty Officer drafts a evaluation on the appropriate departmental node and it is reviewed
by the departmental chain of command. Once the Department Head approves the evaluation he
transmits it on VSLAN to the Executive Officer's node. This assumes compatibility between the
application program for drafting the evaluation, the node's multilevel secure operating system, and
the VSLAN operating system.
3. The Executive Officer reviews all the First Class Petty Officers' evaluations and sends them to the
Personnel Office for printing. (This scenario does not discuss factors of how the Executive Officer
completes his review. It only shows how the VSLAN can be used to automate the evaluation process
ensuring privacy of all individuals concerned.)
An overview of two options of the author's proposed LAN is shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 8 Two options for a MMS, NAVMACS and LAN interface
B. COST INFORMATION
Although the author has not discovered a similar government system to which to compare costs,
cost information is available on selected components of the hypothetical LAN and are summarized
below. It should be noted that the node description previously provided is the basis for total costing.
Although various nodes were listed under several headings the author will assume that 16 nodes are
required.
• Complete Trusted XENIX System [Ref. 28]
(16 at $3,995) $63,920
• VNSC [Ref. 29](hardware & software) $17,500
(.1
• VNSD [Ref. 29]
(16 at $4,250) $68,000
• GateGuard System [Ref. 23: Appendix C] $3,350
• 3B2/600G AT&T Computer (Non-Tempest) [Ref. 23: Appendix C] $3,354
• MMS 300MB Non-removable disk (Non-Tempest) [Ref. 23: Appendix C] $4,620
• MMS 550MB Removable disk storage (Tempest) [Ref. 23: Appendix C] $7,000
• MMS Complete software |Rcf. 23: Appendix C] $5,190
• Miscellaneous (e.g.,Cables, STU-1II SACS) $50,000
• Total $222,934
The author considers the above cost factors to be liberal, meaning actual cost will likely be
greater. Regardless it does provide insight and leads the author to conclude that the cost of installing
a shipboard multilevel secure LAN is practical, and further investigation should be pursued.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The results of this study indicate a shipboard multilevel secure local area network is feasible. The
Navy initiatives with the DMS are considered to be a primary contributing factor to the developmental
process required to implement a shipboard MLS LAN. The key parallel factor between the Navy DMS
initiatives and the shipboard MLS LAN is the implementation of the MMS at NTCCs. The capability
to segregate messages by classification and then distribute them to authorized subscribers is what has
been developed for the NTCCs' operations. This is the exact requirement needed on ships. The system
should be able to be modified to accommodate the requirements of a LAN. Additionally, the required
connectivity for the data source o\' ship messages, the fleet broadcast, is available. Syncrotech
Corporation established that various NAVMACS variants could be connected to GateGuard. Operating
systems for the LAN and node computers are commercially available and properly certified by DoD
standards.
The Navy initiatives with DMS have focused on easing the message processing capabilities at
shore commands. The MMS was designed to serve the NTCCs and the MDS was designed to support
Naval shore commands and their associated LANs. The purpose of the NTS system is to get messages
to fleet units, yet under the DMS initiatives, no fleet unit has been incorporated into research
development. The NAVMACS/GatcGuard connectivity solution has not been pursued beyond the
Syncrotech Corporation report. NAVMACS II is considered to be the future answer to an LAN
interface yet a MLS LAN has not been addressed. NAVCOMPARS is not even considered in the Navy
DMS plan, other than a statement that it warrants future consideration. LAN installations on the
GEORGE WASHINGTON and YELLOWSTONE were initiated by the individual ships. One must
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conclude that the DMS initiatives may benefit shipboard application requirements and an avenue for
mutual pursuit should be established.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The ability of the MMS to be installed on a ship and act as a file server for the LAN should be
further investigated. This will require coordination within OP-094. The command responsible for
implementing DMS within the Navy and the command which conducted the study for Commercial Fiber
Optic LANS For Naval Ships [Ref. 14] are both under the cognizance of OP-094. This thesis shows that
mutual coordination would be beneficial.
The VERD1X Secure LAN and Trusted Information Systems' XENIX trusted operating system
should be considered for shipboard use. Their NCSC Bl certification should facilitate rapid
implementation if application software is or can be made compatible.
The GateGuard/NAVMACS interface should be implemented regardless of the status of
NAVMACS II acquisition. If the NAVMACS V3 and Galeguard can be connected and a multilevel
secure LAN installed on a medium-size ship, the lessons learned could be applied to larger ships. It
seems sensible to start on a small scale and work upwards; for example, evaluate the LAN on a
destroyer and then on an aircraft carrier.
The message center integration is not the only requirement for a multilevel secure LAN.
Electronic libraries are rapidly approaching, and integration will be required. Investigation of the MMS
to connect to CD-ROM should be conducted to facilitate implementation of these libraries.
The ships of the Navy should not be the last entities within the Navy to take advantage that a
LAN offers. The NTS system is designed to get messages to the fleet - - the end user of the information.




SUMMARY OF EVALUATION CRITERIA CLASSES
The classes of systems recognized under ihe trusted computer systems evaluation criteria are as
follows. They are presented in the order of increasing desirability from a computer security point of
view. [SOURCE: Department of Defense "Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria," DoD 5200.28-
STD, December 1985, Appendix C, pp. 93-94.]
Class (D): Minimal Protection
This class is reserved for those systems that have been evaluated but that fail to meet the requirements
of a higher evaluation class.
Class (CI): Discretionary Security Protection
The Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of a class (CI) system nominally satisfies the discretionary security
requirements by providing separation of users and data. It incorporates some form of credible controls
capable of enforcing access limitations on an individual basis, i.e., ostensibly suitable for allowing users
to be able to protect project or private information and to keep other users from accidentally reading
or destroying their data. The class (CI) environment is expected to be one of cooperating users
processing data at the same lcvcl(s) of sensitivity.
Class (C2): Controlled Access Protection
Systems in this class enforce a more finely grained discretionary access control than (CI) systems,
making users individually accountable for their actions through login procedures, auditing of security
relevant events, and resource isolation.
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Class (Bl): Labeled Security Protection
Class (Bl) systems require all the features required for class (C2). In addition, an informal statement
of the security policy model, data labeling, and mandatory access control over named subjects and
objects must be present. The capability must exist for accurately labeling exported information. Any
flaws identified by testing must be removed.
Class (B2): Structured Protection
In class (B2) systems, the TCB is based on a clearly defined and documented formal security policy
model that requires the discretionary and mandatory access control enforcement found in class (Bl)
systems to be extended to all subjects and objects in the ADP system. In addition, covert channels are
addressed. The TCB must be carefully structured into protection-critical and non-protection-critical
elements. The TCB interface is well-defined, and the TCB design and implementation enable it to be
subjected to more thorough testing and more complex review. Authentication mechanisms are
strengthened, trusted facility management is provided in the form of support for system administrator
and operator functions, and stringent configuration management controls are imposed. The system is
relatively resistant to penetration.
Class (B3): Security Domains
The class (B3) TCB must satisfy the reference monitor requirements that it mediate all accesses of
subjects to objects, be tamper-proof, and be small enough to be subjected to analysis and tests. To this
end, the TCB is structured to exclude code not essential to security policy enforcement, with significant
system engineering during TCB design and implementation directed toward minimizing its complexity.
A security administrator is supported, audit mechanisms are expanded to signal security-relevant events,
and system recovery procedures are required. The system is highly resistant to penetration.
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Class (Al): Verified Design
Systems in class (Al) are functionally equivalent to those in class (B3) in that no additional architectural
features or policy requirements are added. The distinguishing feature of systems in this class is the
analysis derived from formal design specification and verification techniques and the resulting high
degree of assurance that the TCB is correctly implemented. This assurance is developmental in nature,
starting with a formal model of the security policy and a formal top-level specification (FTLS) of the
design. In keeping with extensive design and development analysis of the TCB required of systems in
class (Al), more stringent configuration management is required and procedures are established for
securely distributing the system to sites. A system security administrator is supported.
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